Systems and methods for using multiple lateral movement strategies in penetration testing

ABSTRACT

Methods and systems for carrying out multiple campaigns of penetration testing using different lateral movement strategies for discovering and reporting security vulnerabilities of a networked system, the networked system comprising a plurality of network nodes interconnected by one or more networks.

RELATED APPLICATIONS

The present application gains priority from U.S. Provisional PatentApplication 62/558,062 filed on Sep. 13, 2017, and entitled “UsingMultiple Strategies in a Penetration Testing Campaign”.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

There is currently a proliferation of organizational networked computingsystems. Every type of organization, be it a commercial company, auniversity, a bank, a government agency or a hospital, heavily relies onone or more networks interconnecting multiple computing nodes. Failuresof the networked computing system of an organization, or even of only aportion of it, might cause significant damage, up to completely shuttingdown all operations. Additionally, much of the data of the organization,if not all the data, exist somewhere on its networked computing system,including all confidential data comprising the “crown jewels” of theorganization, such as prices, details of customers, purchase orders,employees' salaries, technical formulas, etc. Loss of such data or leaksof such data to unauthorized external entities might be disastrous forthe organization.

Many organizational networks are connected to the Internet at leastthrough one network node, and consequently may be subject to attacks bycomputer hackers or by hostile adversaries. Quite often the newspapersreport incidents in which websites crashed, sensitive data was stolen,or service to customers was denied, where the failures were the resultsof hostile penetration into an organization's networked computingsystem.

Thus, many organizations invest a lot of efforts and costs in preventivemeans designed to protect their computing networks against potentialthreats. There are many defensive products offered in the marketclaiming to provide protection against one or more known modes ofattack, and many organizations arm themselves to the teeth with multipleproducts of this kind.

However, it is difficult to tell how effective such products really arein achieving their stated goals of blocking hostile attacks, andconsequently most CISOs (Computer Information Security Officers) willadmit (maybe only off the record), that they don't really know how wellthey can withstand an attack from a given adversary. The only way toreally know the strength and security of a system, is by trying toattack it as a real adversary would. This is known as red-teaming orpenetration testing (pen testing, in short), and is a very commonapproach that is even required by regulation in some developedcountries.

Penetration testing requires highly talented people to man the testingteam. Those people should be familiar with each and every publicly knownvulnerability and attacking method and should also have a very goodfamiliarity with networking techniques and multiple operating systemsimplementations. Such people are hard to find and therefore manyorganizations give up establishing their own penetration testing teamsand resort to hiring external expert consultants for carrying out thatrole (or completely give up penetration testing). However, externalconsultants are expensive and therefore are typically called in only forbrief periods separated by long intervals in which no penetrationtesting is carried out. This makes the penetration testing ineffective,as vulnerabilities caused by new attacks, that appear almost daily, arediscovered only months after becoming serious threats to theorganization.

Additionally, even rich organizations that can afford hiring talentedexperts for in-house penetration testing teams do not achieve goodprotection. Testing for vulnerabilities of a large network containingmany types of computers, operating systems, network routers and otherdevices is both a very complex and a very tedious process. The processis prone to human errors such as missing testing for certain threats ormisinterpreting the damages of certain attacks. Additionally, because aprocess of full testing against all threats is quite long, theorganization might again end with a too long discovery period after anew threat appears.

In view of the above deficiencies, automated penetration testingsolutions were introduced in recent years by several vendors. Theseautomated solutions reduce human involvement in the penetration testingprocess, or at least in some of its functions.

A penetration testing process involves at least the following mainfunctions: (i) a reconnaissance function, (ii) an attack function, and(iii) a reporting function. The process may also include additionalfunctions, for example a cleanup function that restores the testednetworked system to its original state as it was before the test. In anautomated penetration testing system, at least one of the above threefunctions is at least partially automated, and typically two or three ofthem are at least partially automated.

A reconnaissance function is the function within a penetration testingsystem that handles the collection of data about the tested networkedsystem. The collected data may include internal data of networks nodes,data about network traffic within the tested networked system, businessintelligence data of the organization owning the tested networkedsystem, etc. The functionality of a prior art reconnaissance functioncan be implemented, for example, by software executing in a server thatis not one of the network nodes of the tested networked system, wherethe server probes the tested networked system for the purpose ofcollecting data about it.

An attack function is the function within a penetration testing systemthat handles the determination of whether security vulnerabilities existin the tested networked system based on data collected by thereconnaissance function. The functionality of a prior art attackfunction can be implemented, for example, by software executing in aserver that is not one of the nodes of the tested networked system,where the server attempts to attack the tested networked system for thepurpose of verifying that it can be compromised.

A reporting function is the function within a penetration testing systemthat handles the reporting of results of the penetration testing system.The functionality of a prior art reporting function may be implemented,for example, by software executing in the same server that executes thefunctionality of the attack function, where the server reports thefindings of the attack function to an administrator or a CISO of thetested networked system.

FIG. 1A (PRIOR ART) is a block diagram of code modules of a typicalpenetration testing system. FIG. 1B (PRIOR ART) is a related flow-chart.

In FIG. 1A, code for the reconnaissance function, for the attackfunction, and for the reporting function are respectively labelled as20, 30 and 40, and are each schematically illustrated as part of apenetration testing system code module (PTSCM) labelled as 10. The term‘code’ is intended broadly and may include any combination ofcomputer-executable code and computer-readable data which when readaffects the output of execution of the code. The computer-executablecode may be provided as any combination of human-readable code (e.g. ina scripting language such as Python), machine language code, assemblercode and byte code, or in any form known in the art. Furthermore, theexecutable code may include any stored data (e.g. structured data) suchas configuration files, XML files, and data residing in any type ofdatabase (e.g. a relational database, an object-database, etc.).

In one example and as shown in FIG. 1B, the reconnaissance function(performed in step S21 by execution of reconnaissance function code 20),the attack function (performed in step S31 by execution of attackfunction code 30) and the reporting function (performed in step S41 byexecution of reporting function code 40) are executed in strictlysequential order so that first the reconnaissance function is performedby executing code 20 thereof, then the attack function is performed byexecuting code 30 thereof, and finally the reporting function isperformed 40 by executing code thereof.

However, the skilled artisan will appreciate that this order is just oneexample, and is not a requirement. For example, the attack and thereporting functions may be performed in parallel or in an interleavedway, with the reporting function reporting first results obtained by theattack function, while the attack function is working on additionalresults.

Similarly, the reconnaissance and the attack functions may operate inparallel or in an interleaved way, with the attack function detecting avulnerability based on first data collected by the reconnaissancefunction, while the reconnaissance function is working on collectingadditional data.

FIG. 1A also illustrates code of an optional cleanup function which islabeled as 50. Also illustrated in FIG. 1B is step S51 of performing acleanup function—e.g. by cleanup function code 50 of FIG. 1A.

“A campaign of penetration testing” is a specific run of a specific testof a specific networked system by the penetration testing system.

A penetration-testing-campaign module may comprise at least part ofreconnaissance function code 20, attack function code 30 and optionallycleanup function code 50—for example, in combination with suitablehardware (e.g. one or more computing device(s) 110 and one or moreprocessor(s) 120 thereof, see FIG. 2) for executing the code.

FIG. 2 illustrates a prior art computing device 110 which may have anyform-factor including but not limited to a laptop, a desktop, a mobilephone, a server, a tablet, or any other form factor. The computingdevice 110 in FIG. 2 includes (i) computer memory 160 which may storecode 180; (ii) one or more processors 120 (e.g. central-processing-unit(CPU)) for executing code 180; (iii) one or more human-interfacedevice(s) 140 (e.g. mouse, keyboard, touchscreen, gesture-detectingapparatus including a camera, etc.) or an interface (e.g. USB interface)to receive input from a human-interface device; (iv) a display device130 (e.g. computer screen) or an interface (e.g. HDMI interface, USBinterface) for exporting video to a display device and (v) a networkinterface 150 (e.g. a network card, or a wireless modem).

Memory 160 may include any combination of volatile (e.g. RAM) andnon-volatile (e.g. ROM, flash, disk-drive) memory. Code 180 may includeoperating-system code—e.g. Windows®, Linux®, Android®, Mac-OS®.

Computing device 110 may include a user-interface for receiving inputfrom a user (e.g. manual input, visual input, audio input, or input inany other form) and for visually displaying output. The user-interface(e.g. graphical user interface (GUI)) of computing device 110 may thusinclude the combination of HID device 140 or an interface thereof (i.e.in communication with an external HID device 140), display device 130 oran interface thereof (i.e. in communication with an external displaydevice), and user-interface (UI) code stored in memory 160 and executedby one or more processor(s) 120. The user-interface may include one ormore GUI widgets such as labels, buttons (e.g. radio buttons or checkboxes), sliders, spinners, icons, windows, panels, text boxes, and thelike.

In one example, a penetration testing system is the combination of (i)code 10 (e.g. including reconnaissance function code 20, attack functioncode 30, reporting function code 40, and optionally cleaning functioncode 50); and (ii) one or more computing devices 110 which execute thecode 10. For example, a first computing device may execute a firstportion of code 10 and a second computing device (e.g. in networkedcommunication with the first computing device) may execute a secondportion of code 10.

Penetration testing systems may employ different types of architectures,each having its advantages and disadvantages. Examples are actual attackpenetration testing systems, simulated penetration testing systems andreconnaissance agent penetration testing systems. See the Definitionssection for more details about these types of penetration testingsystems.

The Problem to Solve

When a user desires to operate a prior art penetration testing systemfor running a test on a specific networked system, the penetrationtesting system must know what test it should execute. For example, thepenetration testing system must know what is the type of attackeragainst whom the test is making its assessment (a state-sponsored actor,a cyber-criminal etc.) and what are his capabilities. As anotherexample, the penetration testing system must know what is the goal ofthe attacker according to which the attack will be judged as a successor a failure (copying a specific file and exporting it out of the testednetworked system, encoding a specific directory of a specific networknode for ransom, etc.).

A specific run of a specific test of a specific networked system by apenetration testing system is called a “campaign” of that penetrationtesting system, as defined hereinbelow in definition 18 of the‘Definitions’ section. A collection of values for all information itemsa penetration testing system must know before executing a campaign iscalled “specifications of the campaign” or “scenario”, as definedhereinbelow in definition 23 of the ‘Definitions’ section. For example,the type of the attacker and the goal of the attacker are specificinformation items of a campaign, and specific values for them are partsof the specifications of any campaign.

One special information item of a campaign is the lateral movementstrategy of the attacker during the campaign.

The lateral movement strategy of an attacker is the decision logicapplied by the attacker of a campaign for selecting the next networknode to try to compromise. During a penetration testing campaign, theattacker is assumed to make progress by an iterative process, wherein ineach iteration the attacker selects the next node to attack, based onthe group of network nodes that are already compromised and controlledby the attacker. If the attack on the selected node is successful, thatnode is added to the group of nodes that are already compromised, andanother iteration begins. If the attempt to compromise the selected nodefails, another node is selected, either according to some other rule orrandomly.

All types of penetration testing systems, whether using simulatedpenetration testing, actual attack penetration testing or some otherform of penetration testing, must use a lateral movement strategy. Inpenetration testing systems that actually attack the tested networkedsystem, the lateral movement strategy selects the path of attackactually taken through the networked system. In penetration testingsystems that simulate or evaluate the results of attacking the testednetworked system, the lateral movement strategy selects the path ofattack taken in the simulation or the evaluation through the networkedsystem. Therefore, in the above explanation, the term “attack” should beunderstood to mean “actual attack or simulated attack”, the term“already controls” should be understood to mean “already controls oralready determined to be able to control”, the term “alreadycompromised” should be understood to mean “already compromised oralready determined to be comprisable”, etc.

A simple example of a lateral movement strategy is a “depth first”strategy, in which the next network node to attempt to compromise is anetwork node that is not yet compromised and is an immediate neighbor ofthe last network node that was compromised, provided such neighbor nodeexists. Two network nodes are “immediate neighbors” of each other if andonly if they have a direct communication link between them that does notpass through any other network node.

Another simple example is a “breadth search” strategy, in which the nextnetwork node to attempt to compromise is a network node that is not yetcompromised and whose distance from the first node compromised by thecampaign is the smallest possible. The distance between two networknodes is the number of network nodes along the shortest path betweenthem, plus one. A path is an ordered list of network nodes in which eachpair of adjacent nodes in the list is a pair of immediate neighbors.Thus, the distance between two immediate neighbors is one.

An example of a more advanced lateral movement strategy is a strategythat is applicable when a goal of the attacker is related to a resourceof the networked system that resides in a specific network node. In suchcase, the next network node to try to compromise may be selected bydetermining the shortest path in the networked system leading from analready compromised node to the specific node containing the desiredresource, and selecting the first node on the determined path to be thenext node to attempt to compromise. If the shortest path has a length ofone, which occurs when the specific node is an immediate neighbor of analready compromised node, then the next node to attempt to compromise isthe specific node containing the desired resource.

Another example of a lateral movement strategy is a strategy that givespriority to network nodes satisfying a specific condition, for examplenodes that are known to have a specific weakness, such as running theWindows XP operating system. In such case, the next node to attempt tocompromise is a node that satisfies the condition and is also animmediate neighbor of an already compromised node, if such node exists.

In prior art penetration testing systems, an attacker can only have asingle lateral movement strategy, which may be (i) selected by thedesigner of the penetration testing system and cannot be changed at all,(ii) selected by the penetration testing system at runtime, for exampleaccording to the type of attacker selected for the current campaign, andcannot be changed by the user, or (iii) selected by the user, whenconfiguring the campaign.

The lateral movement strategy used during a campaign may impact theresults of the campaign. At a given decision point, a first strategy maylead to picking one network node to be the next node to attack, while asecond strategy may lead to picking another network node to be the nextnode to attack. This distinction may then create a broader and broaderdifference between running the campaign using the first strategy andrunning it using the second strategy. If the key to conquering thetested networked system is the compromising of a specific administratornode, one strategy may be “lucky” and attack that specific node early inthe campaign, while the other strategy may be “unlucky” and waste a lotof time attempting to break into many unimportant nodes before finallyreaching the specific administrator node. Thus, the choice of strategymight significantly affect the length of time required for thepenetration testing system to compromise the specific node and/or thetested network.

While the previous example demonstrates a difference in execution time,in this example both strategies eventually produce the same result.However, this is not always the case. Real-world organizations may havethousands and even tens of thousands of network nodes. Exhaustivelytesting such huge network until each node is compromised and controlledby the attacker is practically impossible because of the amount of timethis might require. Therefore, penetration testing campaigns aretypically provided with a time limit for their execution, which may bean hour or a day, or some other time value of a similar magnitude.

If a time-limited campaign is executed with each of the two strategiesdescribed above, the outcome might be such that with one strategy theresult of the test is a successful compromising of the tested network,while with the other strategy the result is a failure in compromisingthe network because of aborting the test when hitting the time limit. Inthe latter case, the results presented to the operator of thepenetration testing system will be misleading—the report will say thepenetration attempt failed and the system is safe, while in reality thisis not the case.

This situation is clearly undesirable and should be remedied.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

Some embodiments of the invention relate to methods and systems forcarrying out automated penetration testing, in which a plurality ofsimilar penetration testing campaigns are executed, each of thepenetration testing campaigns using a different lateral movementstrategy.

According to an aspect of an embodiment of the invention, there isprovided a method of penetration testing of a networked system by apenetration testing system that is controlled by a user interface of acomputing device, the method including:

a. selecting a plurality of lateral movement strategies from a group oftwo or more lateral movement strategies that are available to be used inpenetration testing campaigns;

b. executing, by the penetration testing system, a plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns, wherein (i) the number of penetrationtesting campaigns in the plurality of penetration testing campaigns isequal to the number of lateral movement strategies in the selectedplurality of lateral movement strategies, (ii) for each specific lateralmovement strategy in the selected plurality of lateral movementstrategies there is a corresponding penetration testing campaign in theplurality of penetration testing campaigns that uses the specificlateral movement strategy as the lateral movement strategy of theattacker of the corresponding penetration testing campaign, and (iii)for any two penetration testing campaigns in the plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns and for any specific information item ofpenetration testing campaigns other than lateral movement strategy,values of the specific information item in the two penetration testingcampaigns are equal; and

c. reporting, by the penetration testing system, at least one securityvulnerability determined to exist in the networked system by theexecuting of the plurality of penetration testing campaigns, wherein thereporting includes at least one of (i) causing a display device todisplay a report including information about the at least one securityvulnerability, (ii) storing the report including information about theat least one security vulnerability in a file, and (iii) electronicallytransmitting the report including information about the at least onesecurity vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the selecting of the plurality of lateral movementstrategies includes selecting all of the lateral movement strategies inthe group of two or more lateral movement strategies to be the selectedplurality of lateral movement strategies.

In some embodiments, the selecting of the plurality of lateral movementstrategies includes selecting only some of the lateral movementstrategies in the group of two or more lateral movement strategies to bethe selected plurality of lateral movement strategies.

In some embodiments, the selecting of the plurality of lateral movementstrategies includes automatically selecting the plurality of lateralmovement strategies from the group of two or more lateral movementstrategies, by the penetration testing system. In some embodiments, theautomatically selecting of the plurality of lateral movement strategiesis based on a value of an information item of the plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns. In other embodiments, the automaticallyselecting of the plurality of lateral movement strategies is a randomselection.

In some embodiments, the selecting of the plurality of lateral movementstrategies includes receiving, by the penetration testing system and viathe user interface of the computing device, one or more manually-enteredinputs, the one or more manually-entered inputs selecting the pluralityof lateral movement strategies from the group of two or more lateralmovement strategies.

In some embodiments, a number of lateral movement strategies in theselected plurality of lateral movement strategies is pre-defined by avendor of the penetration testing system.

In some embodiments, a number of lateral movement strategies in theselected plurality of lateral movement strategies depends on a value ofan information item of the plurality of penetration testing campaigns.

In some embodiments, the selecting of the plurality of lateral movementstrategies includes receiving, by the penetration testing system and viathe user interface of the computing device, one or more manually-enteredinputs, the one or more manually-entered inputs defining a number oflateral movement strategies in the selected plurality of lateralmovement strategies.

In some embodiments, the method further includes:

d. receiving, by the penetration testing system and via the userinterface of the computing device, one or more manually-entered inputs,the one or more manually-entered inputs instructing the penetrationtesting system to enter a mode in which the selecting of the pluralityof lateral movement strategies is enabled.

In some embodiments, the group of two or more lateral movementstrategies that are available to be used in penetration testingcampaigns is pre-defined by a vendor of the penetration testing system.

In some embodiments, the method further includes, prior to theselecting, determining, by the penetration testing system, the group oftwo or more lateral movement strategies that are available to be used inpenetration testing campaigns.

In some embodiments, the determining of the group of two or more lateralmovement strategies that are available to be used in penetration testingcampaigns includes receiving, by the penetration testing system and viathe user interface of the computing device, one or more manually-enteredinputs, the one or more manually-entered inputs determining the group oftwo or more lateral movement strategies that are available to be used inpenetration testing campaigns.

In some embodiments, the determining of the group of two or more lateralmovement strategies that are available to be used in penetration testingcampaigns is based on a value of an information item of the plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns.

In some embodiments, the executing of the plurality of penetrationtesting campaigns includes executing at least two penetration testingcampaigns of the plurality of penetration testing campaigns in parallel.In some such embodiments, the at least two penetration testing campaignsof the plurality of penetration testing campaigns use simulatedpenetration testing or reconnaissance agent penetration testing.

In some embodiments, the executing of the plurality of penetrationtesting campaigns includes executing at least two penetration testingcampaigns of the plurality of penetration testing campaigns in series.In some such embodiments, the at least two penetration testing campaignsof the plurality of penetration testing campaigns use actual attackpenetration testing.

In some embodiments, the at least two penetration testing campaignsexecuted in series are executed according to an order of thecorresponding lateral movement strategies, wherein the order of thelateral movement strategies is pre-defined by a vendor of thepenetration testing system. In other embodiments, the at least twopenetration testing campaigns executed in series are executed accordingto a random order determined at the time of the executing.

In some embodiments, for each given lateral movement strategy in theselected plurality of lateral movement strategies, there is at least oneevent during the executing of the corresponding penetration testingcampaign, in which a network node of the networked system is selected tobe the next network node to be attacked by the attacker of thecorresponding penetration testing campaign according to the givenlateral movement strategy.

In some embodiments, the executing the plurality of penetration testingcampaigns includes assigning a corresponding time limit to eachpenetration testing campaign of the plurality of penetration testingcampaigns, wherein execution time of each penetration testing campaignof the plurality of penetration testing campaigns is limited by thecorresponding time limit.

In some embodiments, the plurality of penetration testing campaignsincludes a first penetration testing campaign and a second penetrationtesting campaign, wherein the time limit assigned to the firstpenetration testing campaign is different from the time limit assignedto the second penetration testing campaign. In other embodiments, thetime limits assigned to all of the penetration testing campaigns in theplurality of penetration testing campaigns are the same.

In some embodiments, the executing of the plurality of penetrationtesting campaigns includes executing each of the plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns to completion.

In some embodiments, the executing of the plurality of penetrationtesting campaigns includes: in response to determining, by onepenetration testing campaign of the plurality of penetration testingcampaigns, that at least one security vulnerability exists in thenetworked system, (i) aborting all penetration testing campaigns of theplurality of penetration testing campaigns that are running at the timeof the determining, and (ii) cancelling execution of all penetrationtesting campaigns of the plurality of penetration testing campaignsscheduled to be executed that have not yet started execution.

According to an aspect of an embodiment of the invention, there isprovided a penetration testing system for penetration testing of anetworked system, the penetration testing system including:

1. a set-up module including:

-   -   i. one or more set-up processors; and    -   ii. a set-up non-transitory computer readable storage medium for        instructions execution by the one or more set-up processors, the        set-up non-transitory computer readable storage medium having        stored instructions to select a plurality of lateral movement        strategies from a group of two or more lateral movement        strategies that are available to be used in penetration testing        campaigns;

2. a penetration-testing-campaign module including:

-   -   i. one or more penetration-testing-campaign processors; and    -   ii. a penetration-testing-campaign non-transitory computer        readable storage medium for instructions execution by the one or        more penetration-testing-campaign processors, the        penetration-testing-campaign non-transitory computer readable        storage medium having stored instructions to execute a plurality        of penetration testing campaigns, wherein (i) the number of        penetration testing campaigns in the plurality of penetration        testing campaigns is equal to the number of lateral movement        strategies in the selected plurality of lateral movement        strategies, (ii) for each specific lateral movement strategy in        the selected plurality of lateral movement strategies there is a        corresponding penetration testing campaign in the plurality of        penetration testing campaigns that uses the specific lateral        movement strategy as the lateral movement strategy of the        attacker of the corresponding penetration testing campaign,        and (iii) for any two penetration testing campaigns in the        plurality of penetration testing campaigns and for any specific        information item of penetration testing campaigns other than        lateral movement strategy, values of the specific information        item in the two penetration testing campaigns are equal; and

3. a reporting module, including:

-   -   i. one or more reporting processors; and    -   ii. a reporting non-transitory computer readable storage medium        for instructions execution by the one or more reporting        processors, the reporting non-transitory computer readable        storage medium having stored instructions to report at least one        security vulnerability determined to exist in the networked        system according to results of the plurality of penetration        testing campaigns executed by the penetration testing campaign        module, the instructions to report including at least one of (i)        instructions to cause a display device to display a report        including information about the at least one security        vulnerability, (ii) instructions to store the report including        information about the at least one security vulnerability in a        file, and (iii) instructions to electronically transmit the        report including information about the at least one security        vulnerability.

In some embodiments, the instructions to select the plurality of lateralmovement strategies include instructions to select all of the lateralmovement strategies in the group of two or more lateral movementstrategies to be the selected plurality of lateral movement strategies.

In some embodiments, the instructions to select the plurality of lateralmovement strategies include instructions to select only some of thelateral movement strategies in the group of two or more lateral movementstrategies to be the selected plurality of lateral movement strategies.

In some embodiments, the instructions to select the plurality of lateralmovement strategies include instructions to automatically select theplurality of lateral movement strategies from the group of two or morelateral movement strategies, by the penetration testing system. In someembodiments, the instructions to automatically select the plurality oflateral movement strategies include instructions to automatically selectthe plurality of lateral movement strategies based on a value of aninformation item of the plurality of penetration testing campaigns. Inother embodiments, the instructions to automatically select theplurality of lateral movement strategies include instructions toautomatically select the plurality of lateral movement strategies byrandom selection.

In some embodiments, the instructions to select the plurality of lateralmovement strategies include instructions to receive, via a userinterface of a computing device, one or more manually-entered inputs,the one or more manually-entered inputs selecting the plurality oflateral movement strategies from the group of two or more lateralmovement strategies.

In some embodiments, a number of lateral movement strategies to beselected by the instructions to select the plurality of lateral movementstrategies is pre-defined by a vendor of the penetration testing system.

In some embodiments, a number of lateral movement strategies to beselected by the instructions to select the plurality of lateral movementstrategies depends on a value of an information item of the plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns.

In some embodiments, the instructions to select the plurality of lateralmovement strategies includes instructions to receive, via a userinterface of a computing device, one or more manually-entered inputs,the one or more manually-entered inputs defining a number of lateralmovement strategies in the selected plurality of lateral movementstrategies.

In some embodiments, the set-up non-transitory computer readable storagemedium further having stored instructions to receive, via a userinterface of a computing device, one or more manually-entered inputs,the one or more manually-entered inputs instructing the penetrationtesting system to enter a mode in which the selecting of the pluralityof lateral movement strategies is enabled.

In some embodiments, the group of two or more lateral movementstrategies that are available to be used in penetration testingcampaigns is pre-defined by a vendor of the penetration testing system.

In some embodiments, the set-up non-transitory computer readable storagemedium further having stored instructions, to be carried out beforecarrying out the instructions to select, to determine the group of twoor more lateral movement strategies that are available to be used inpenetration testing campaigns.

In some embodiments, the instructions to determine the group of two ormore lateral movement strategies that are available to be used inpenetration testing campaigns include instructions to receive, via auser interface of a computing device, one or more manually-enteredinputs, the one or more manually-entered inputs determining the group oftwo or more lateral movement strategies that are available to be used inpenetration testing campaigns.

In some embodiments, the instructions to determine the group of two ormore lateral movement strategies that are available to be used inpenetration testing campaigns include instructions to determine thegroup of two or more lateral movement strategies based on a value of aninformation item of the plurality of penetration testing campaigns.

In some embodiments, the instructions to execute the plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns include instructions to execute at leasttwo penetration testing campaigns of the plurality of penetrationtesting campaigns in parallel. In some such embodiments, the at leasttwo penetration testing campaigns of the plurality of penetrationtesting campaigns use simulated penetration testing or reconnaissanceagent penetration testing.

In some embodiments, the instructions to execute the plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns include instructions to execute at leasttwo penetration testing campaigns of the plurality of penetrationtesting campaigns in series. In some such embodiments, the at least twopenetration testing campaigns of the plurality of penetration testingcampaigns use actual attack penetration testing.

In some embodiments, the instructions to execute the at least twopenetration testing campaigns in series include instructions to executethe at least two penetration testing campaigns according to an order ofthe corresponding lateral movement strategies, wherein the order of thelateral movement strategies is pre-defined by a vendor of thepenetration testing system. In other embodiments, the instructions toexecute the at least two penetration testing campaigns in series includeinstructions to execute the at least two penetration testing campaignsaccording to a random order determined at the time of the executing.

In some embodiments, the instructions to execute the plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns include instructions to assign acorresponding time limit to each penetration testing campaign of theplurality of penetration testing campaigns, and wherein, in theinstructions to execute, execution time of each penetration testingcampaign of the plurality of penetration testing campaigns is limited bythe corresponding time limit.

In some embodiments, the plurality of penetration testing campaignsincludes a first penetration testing campaign and a second penetrationtesting campaign, wherein the instructions to assign the correspondingtime limit include instructions to assign different time limits to thefirst penetration testing campaign and to the second penetration testingcampaign.

In some embodiments, the instructions to assign the corresponding timelimit include instructions to assign the same time limit to all of thepenetration testing campaigns in the plurality of penetration testingcampaigns.

In some embodiments, the instructions to execute the plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns include instructions to execute each ofthe plurality of penetration testing campaigns to completion. In otherembodiments, the instructions to execute the plurality of penetrationtesting campaigns include instructions, to be carried out in response todetermining, by one penetration testing campaign of the plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns, that at least one security vulnerabilityexists in the networked system, to: (i) abort all penetration testingcampaigns of the plurality of penetration testing campaigns that arerunning at the time of the determining, and (ii) cancel execution of allpenetration testing campaigns of the plurality of penetration testingcampaigns scheduled to be executed that have not yet started execution.

Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used hereinhave the same meaning as commonly understood by one of ordinary skill inthe art to which the invention pertains, unless explicitly defined inthis application. In case of conflict, the specification, includingdefinitions, will take precedence.

As used herein, the terms “comprising”, “including”, “having” andgrammatical variants thereof are to be taken as specifying the statedfeatures, integers, steps or components but do not preclude the additionof one or more additional features, integers, steps, components orgroups thereof. These terms encompass the terms “consisting of” and“consisting essentially of”.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

The invention is herein described, by way of example only, withreference to the accompanying drawings. With specific reference now tothe drawings in detail, it is stressed that the particulars shown are byway of example and for purposes of illustrative discussion of thepreferred embodiments of the present invention only, and are presentedin the cause of providing what is believed to be the most useful andreadily understood description of the principles and conceptual aspectsof the invention. In this regard, no attempt is made to show structuraldetails of the invention in more detail than is necessary for afundamental understanding of the invention, the description taken withthe drawings making apparent to those skilled in the art how the severalforms of the invention may be embodied in practice. Throughout thedrawings, like-referenced characters are used to designate likeelements.

In the drawings:

FIG. 1A (PRIOR ART) is a block diagram of code modules of a typicalpenetration testing system;

FIG. 1B (PRIOR ART) is a flow-chart related to the system of FIG. 1A;

FIG. 2 (PRIOR ART) illustrates a prior art computing device;

FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a penetration testing system according toan embodiment of the invention;

FIGS. 4A, 4B, and 4C together are a flow chart of a method forpenetration testing of a networked system according to an embodiment ofthe invention;

FIG. 5 illustrates a first example of user engagements of a userinterface according to a second embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 6 illustrates a second example of user engagements of a userinterface according to a third embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 7 illustrates a third example of user engagements of a userinterface according to a fourth embodiment of the invention; and

FIG. 8 illustrates a fourth example of user engagements of a userinterface according to a fifth embodiment of the invention.

DESCRIPTION OF SOME EMBODIMENTS OF THE INVENTION

The invention, in some embodiments, relates to penetration testing of anetworked system, and specifically penetration testing which includesexecuting of a plurality of penetration testing campaigns each using adifferent lateral movement strategy.

The present disclosure should be interpreted according to thedefinitions in the “Definitions Section” at the end of thespecification. In case of a contradiction between the definitions in the“Definitions Section” at the end of the specification and other sectionsof this disclosure, the “Definitions Section” at the end of thespecification section should prevail.

In case of a contradiction between the “Definitions Section” at the endof the specification and a definition or a description in any otherdocument, including in another document incorporated in this disclosureby reference, the “Definitions Section” at the end of the specificationshould prevail, even if the definition or the description in the otherdocument is commonly accepted by a person of ordinary skill in the art.

The present invention provides a solution to the challenges discussedhereinabove with respect to the prior art, and specifically provides apenetration testing system that, when instructed to execute a campaign,executes multiple campaigns that are almost the same and differ only inthe lateral movement strategies of their attackers.

The value of the lateral movement strategy of the attacker of a campaignis a value of one of the information items of the campaign. Therefore,two campaigns that have identical values for each and every one of theirinformation items except the lateral movement strategies of theirattackers are, formally speaking, not “the same campaign”. For thepurpose of this disclosure, two campaigns are considered to be “almostthe same” when they have the same values for all the information itemscharacterizing the two campaigns, except for the values of the lateralmovement strategies of their attackers.

In a first embodiment of the invention, the penetration testing systemautomatically selects multiple lateral movement strategies to be used,before starting execution of a campaign, without the user having anyinfluence on the selection of strategies. The lateral movementstrategies are selected from a list of pre-defined available strategies.For example, the system may select the two strategies “BFS” and “DFS”from a list of strategies including these two strategies. Wheninstructed to run a campaign, the penetration testing systemautomatically executes multiple campaigns, differing only in theirlateral movement strategy, thus being almost the same campaigns. Eachcampaign of the multiple campaigns uses a different strategy from thelist of selected strategies. In the above example, there will be twocampaigns, one having a strategy of “BFS”, and the other having astrategy of “DFS”.

The multiple strategies selected for use may be all the strategies inthe pre-defined list of available strategies. In such a case, all thestrategies available for use in the penetration testing system are infact used in testing the tested networked system. In other words, thenumber of campaigns that are executed following the user's request for asingle campaign, is equal to the number of available strategies.Alternatively, the multiple strategies selected for use may be a propersubset of the pre-defined list of available strategies. In such case thesystem may automatically select strategies based on values of one ormore information items of the campaign other than the lateral movementstrategy, in a similar manner to that described in U.S. application Ser.No. 15/681,782, which is incorporated by reference as though fully setforth herein, or based on a random selection in a similar manner to thatdescribed in U.S. application Ser. No. 15/869,128, which is incorporatedby reference as though fully set forth herein. For example, certainstrategies may be preferred when the goal of the attacker is “export asmany files out of the networked system”, while other strategies may bepreferred when the goal of the attacker is “export a given file from agiven network node”.

In the first embodiment, the number of strategies to be used isautomatically determined by the system. It may be a pre-defined number,for example defined by the designer of the penetration testing system,or it may be selected by the penetration testing system based on valuesof one or more other information items of the campaign.

In some embodiments, the multiple campaigns may be executed by thepenetration testing system in parallel. In such case, the multiplecampaigns make progress side-by-side. This may be implemented, forexample, by having multiple threads, multiple processes, or multiplevirtual machines within the penetration testing system each execute onecampaign using one of the multiple selected strategies.

In some embodiments, all campaigns may run to completion, be it failureto make additional progress or success in achieving the goal of theattacker of the campaign. In other embodiments, when one of the multiplecampaigns succeeds in achieving the goal, which is common to all runningcampaigns, all other campaigns which are currently running are aborted,and any campaigns scheduled to run are cancelled, as it has already beendetermined that the system can be compromised. Alternatively oradditionally, each of the multiple campaigns may be assigned a timelimit, after which it is aborted if not yet successful in achieving thegoal. The time limit of a campaign may depend on the lateral movementstrategy assigned to the campaign and thus be different for differentcampaigns, or may be the same time limit for all the multiple campaigns.

Running campaigns in parallel is always possible when the penetrationtesting system validates its findings about potential securityvulnerabilities by simulating or otherwise evaluating the vulnerability.In such a penetration testing system, each of the multiple campaignsexecutes in its own thread, process, or virtual machine, and nointerference occurs between campaigns, even though they apply to thesame tested networked system. However, in a penetration testing systemthat validates its findings about potential security vulnerabilities byactually attempting to attack the tested networked system, it ispossible that two campaigns running in parallel might attempt to changea state or a setting of a network node in an incompatible way, thusinterfering with each other.

As such, when such interference is a possibility, and taking intoaccount the type of penetration testing system, the tested networkedsystem, and the information items specified for the campaigns, serialexecution may be preferable to parallel execution of the campaigns.Serial execution has the additional advantage of not requiringmulti-processing and/or multiple virtual machines in the penetrationtesting system.

When executing the multiple campaigns serially, the system puts theselected strategies in an ordered list, and executes campaigns with eachof the selected strategies according to that order. The ordering ofstrategies may be fixed, for example pre-defined by a vendor of thesystem, or may be randomly decided for each case. The execution of eachcampaign may be limited by a corresponding time-limit, so that astrategy that fails to terminate quickly shall not consume too muchtime. Optionally, when a campaign succeeds in achieving its goal, thetest is terminated, and running of additional campaigns is cancelled, asit is already determined that the system can be compromised.

Regardless of whether the multiple campaigns are executed in parallel orin series, in view of the execution of multiple almost-the-samecampaigns with different strategies, it is highly unlikely that adamaging vulnerability in some network node will escape detection. Thisis in contrast with prior art penetration testing systems, that wheninstructed by their users to execute a campaign always use the samestrategy. Therefore, if they happen to miss a certain vulnerability in afirst run, they are likely to also miss it on any repeated run of thatcampaign.

In a second embodiment, the user has some control over the selection ofthe multiple strategies. In this embodiment, the user manually activatesan operating mode in which each campaign is executed using multiplestrategies. As long as this mode is active, and only when this mode isactive, the penetration testing system selects multiple strategies touse for each executed campaign, as in the first embodiment.

In a third embodiment, the user selects the number of differentstrategies to be used, for example two different strategies or threedifferent strategies. This may be in addition to the user activating amultiple-strategies mode, as in the second embodiment, or without havingsuch a special mode, as in the first embodiment.

In a fourth embodiment, the user selects which of the pre-definedstrategies will be available to the system for selection. As such, inthis embodiment the user defines the list of available strategies. Thismay be in addition to the user activating a multiple-strategies mode, asin the second embodiment, or without having such special mode, as in thefirst embodiment. Furthermore, this may be in addition to the userselecting the number of different strategies to use, as in the thirdembodiment, or without the user having such ability, as in the firstembodiment.

In an example in which the user has relatively broad control, the usermay be presented with an array of multiple check-boxes, eachcorresponding to one available strategy. If the user selects only one ofthe check-boxes, this is interpreted to mean only a single campaignshould run, and the multiple-strategies mode should be disabled. In suchcase the single checked strategy is defined by the user and the singlecampaign to execute will use that strategy. If, however, the userselects multiple check-boxes, which may even be all of the check-boxes,the system removes all unchecked strategies from consideration andselects multiple strategies only from the subset of strategies that werechecked by the user. Thus, the user has an option for limiting theautomatic selection by the system by eliminating strategies he does notwant to be used.

In a fifth embodiment, the user controls which of the pre-definedstrategies will be used for running the multiple “almost the same”campaigns. This may be in addition to the user activating amultiple-strategies mode, as in the second embodiment, or without havingsuch special mode, as in the first embodiment. In this embodiment, theuser may also select the number of strategies to be used at the time ofselecting the strategies to use. Alternatively, the number of strategiesto use may be outside the user's control, and the user must selectexactly that number of strategies.

In an example in which the user has very broad control, the user may bepresented with an array of multiple check-boxes, each corresponding toone available strategy. If the user selects only one of the check-boxes,this is interpreted to mean only a single campaign should run, and themultiple-strategies mode should be disabled. In such case the singlechecked strategy is defined by the user and the single campaign toexecute will use that strategy. If, however, the user checks multiplecheck-boxes, which may even be all of the available check-boxes, thenthe checked strategies, and only the checked strategies, will be used bycampaigns. Thus, the user defines both the number of strategies to useand which strategies to use.

Reference is now made to FIG. 3, which is a block diagram of apenetration testing system 200 according to an embodiment of theinvention.

As seen in FIG. 3, the penetration testing system 200 includes a set-upmodule 210, adapted for setting up multiple penetration testingcampaigns. The set-up module 210 may include one or more set-upprocessors 212, and a set-up memory 214, such as a non-transitorycomputer readable storage medium, having stored thereon instructions tobe executed by the one or more set-up processors 212. In someembodiments, the set-up memory 214 has stored instructions to select aplurality of lateral movement strategies from a group of two or morelateral movement strategies that are available to be used in penetrationtesting campaigns.

As explained in further detail hereinbelow, the instructions to select aplurality of lateral movement strategies may include instruction toselect all the available lateral movement strategies in the group ofavailable lateral movement strategies, or instructions to select aproper subset of the group of available lateral movement strategies.

System 200 further includes a penetration-testing-campaign module 220,functionally associated with set-up module 210 and including one or morepenetration-testing-campaign processors 222 and apenetration-testing-campaign memory 224, such as a non-transitorycomputer readable storage medium, having stored thereon instructions tobe executed by the one or more penetration-testing-campaign processors222. The memory 224 has stored instructions to execute a plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns. The number of executed penetrationtesting campaigns is equal to the number of lateral movement strategiesselected by carrying out the instructions stored in memory 214, suchthat for each specific lateral movement strategy there is acorresponding penetration testing campaign that uses the specificlateral movement strategy as the lateral movement strategy of theattacker. For any two penetration testing campaigns executed accordingto the instructions stored in memory 224, for any specific informationitem of penetration testing campaigns other than lateral movementstrategy, values of the specific information item in the two penetrationtesting campaigns are equal.

In some embodiments, the instructions stored in memory 224 are toexecute at least two of the plurality of penetration testing campaignsin parallel. This may be particularly useful when the at least twocampaigns use simulated penetration testing or reconnaissance agentpenetration testing.

In some embodiments, the instructions stored in memory 224 are toexecute at least two of the plurality of penetration testing campaignsin series. This may be particularly useful when the at least twocampaigns use actual attack penetration testing.

In some embodiments, in which the instructions stored in memory 224 areto execute the plurality of penetration testing campaigns in series, theinstructions also specify that the serial execution of the campaignsshould be according to an order of the corresponding lateral movementstrategies used in the campaigns. The order of the lateral movementstrategies may be pre-defined by a vendor of the penetration testingsystem, or may be randomly determined at the time of executing thecampaigns.

In some embodiments, memory 224 further has stored instructions toassign a corresponding time limit to each penetration testing campaignof said plurality of penetration testing campaigns, and in theinstructions to execute, execution time of each penetration testingcampaign is limited by the corresponding time limit.

In some embodiments, different penetration testing campaigns areassigned different time limits, for example based on a characteristic ofthe corresponding lateral movement strategies of the campaigns. In otherembodiments, the same time limit may be assigned to all the campaignsbeing executed according to the instructions stored in memory 224.

In some embodiments, the instructions to execute the penetration testingcampaigns comprise instructions to execute each of the plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns to completion. In other embodiments, theinstructions to execute the plurality of penetration testing campaignsinclude instructions to be carried out if it is determined by one (ormore) of the penetration testing campaigns that at least one securityvulnerability exists in the networked system. According to suchinstructions, all penetration testing campaigns that are running at thetime of determination are aborted, and execution of all penetrationtesting campaigns of the plurality of penetration testing campaignsscheduled to be executed that have not yet started execution iscanceled.

System 200 further includes a reporting module 230, functionallyassociated with a user interface 240 and withpenetration-testing-campaign module 220. Reporting module 230 includesone or more reporting processors 232, and a reporting memory 234, suchas a non-transitory computer readable storage medium, having storedthereon instructions to be executed by the one or more reportingprocessors 232. The reporting memory 234 has stored instructions toreport at least one security vulnerability detected or determined toexist in the networked system according to results of one or more of thepenetration testing campaigns executed by penetration-testing-campaignmodule 220. The instructions to report include at least one of:

(i) instructions to cause a display device (e.g. of user interface 240or another display device, which may be located remotely to thereporting module 230) to display a report containing information aboutthe detected security vulnerability;

(ii) instructions to store the report containing information about thedetected security vulnerability in a file; and

(iii) instructions to electronically transmit the report containinginformation about the detected security vulnerability, for example usinga transceiver 236 functionally associated with the reporting module 230.

In some embodiments, the instructions stored in memory 214 includeinstructions to select a plurality of lateral movement strategiesautomatically, for example based on a value of an information item ofthe penetration testing campaigns which will use the strategies, or atrandom.

In some embodiments, the instructions to select a plurality of lateralmovement strategies include instructions to select a specific number oflateral movement strategies. In some embodiments, the number may bepre-defined by a vendor of the penetration testing system, and/or maydepend on a value of an information item of the campaigns to beexecuted.

In some embodiments, the set-up module 210 is functionally associatedwith the user interface 240, and the user interface 240 may include oneor more user interface components 242 for manual and explicit definitionof the group of lateral movement strategies available for selection bythe set-up module 210.

In some embodiments, set-up memory 214 further has stored instructionsto receive, via the user interface 240, one or more manually enteredinputs. In embodiments, the one or more inputs provide the number oflateral movement strategies to be selected, as described in greaterdetail hereinbelow with reference to FIG. 6. In some embodiments, theone or more inputs explicitly select the plurality of lateral movementstrategies to be used in penetration testing campaigns, as explained infurther detail hereinbelow with reference to FIG. 8.

In some embodiments, the set-up memory 214 also has stored instructionsto receive one or more manually-entered inputs which instruct thepenetration testing system to enter a mode in which selection of aplurality of lateral movement strategies is enabled, as explainedhereinbelow with reference to FIG. 5.

In some embodiments, the group of two or more lateral movementstrategies that are available for selection is pre-defined, for exampleby a vendor of the penetration testing system. In other embodiments, theset-up memory 214 also has stored instructions to determine the group oflateral movement strategies that are available to be used in penetrationtesting campaigns. These instructions are to be carried out beforeselection of the lateral movement strategies to be used.

In some embodiments, the instructions to determine the group ofavailable lateral movement strategies include instructions to receive,via user interface 240, one or more manually-entered inputs whichdetermine the group of lateral movement strategies available for use inpenetration testing campaigns, as described in further detailhereinbelow with respect to FIG. 7.

In some embodiments, the group of available lateral movement strategiesare determined based on a value of an information item of the pluralityof penetration testing campaigns.

In some embodiments, system 200 further includes a reconnaissance module250 adapted to carry out a reconnaissance function, an attack module 255adapted to carry out an attack function, and optionally a cleanup module260 adapted to carry out a cleanup function as described hereinabove.The penetration-testing-campaign module 220 may include at least part ofthe reconnaissance module 250 carrying out reconnaissance function code,the attack module 255 carrying out the attack function code, andoptionally the cleanup module 260 carrying out cleanup function code.

In some embodiments, the penetration-testing-campaign memory 224,reporting memory 234, and set-up memory 214 are each a dedicated, andseparate, memory component or storage medium. In other embodiments, atleast two of the penetration-testing-campaign memory 224, reportingmemory 234, and set-up memory 214 may be part of the same memorycomponent or storage medium.

In some embodiments, the set-up processor(s) 212,penetration-testing-campaign processor(s) 222, and reportingprocessor(s) 232 are each dedicated, and separate, processors. In otherembodiments, at least two of the set-up processor(s) 212,penetration-testing-campaign processor(s) 222, and reportingprocessor(s) 232 share at least one common processor.

FIGS. 4A, 4B, and 4C, together, are a flow-chart of a method ofpenetration testing of a networked system by a penetration testingsystem using a plurality of penetration testing campaigns each employinga different lateral movement strategy.

In step S300 of FIG. 4B, the penetration testing system selects aplurality of lateral movement strategies from a group of two or morelateral movement strategies available for use in penetration testingcampaigns. Embodiments of implementation of step S300 are described infurther detail hereinbelow.

In some embodiments, the selected plurality of lateral movementstrategies may be a proper subset of the group of two or more lateralmovement strategies. In other embodiments, the selected lateral movementstrategies are all the lateral movement strategies in the group ofavailable lateral movement strategies.

Turning to FIG. 4C, in step S302 a plurality of penetration testingcampaigns is executed by the penetration testing system, for example bypenetration-testing-campaign module 220 of FIG. 3, so as to test thenetworked system. The number of penetration testing campaigns executedis equal to the number of selected lateral movement strategies, suchthat each campaign uses a different one of the selected lateral movementstrategies as the lateral movement strategy of the attacker of thecorresponding penetration testing campaign. As such, each selectedlateral movement strategy is used in a corresponding penetration testingcampaign. In all the penetration testing campaigns being executed, thevalues for all information items of the campaigns other than the lateralmovement strategy, are equal. As such, the penetration testing campaignsare “almost the same”, with the only distinguishing value being that ofthe lateral movement strategy.

Execution of each of the penetration testing campaigns includesselecting the next network node to be attacked or to attempt tocompromise, according to the corresponding selected lateral movementstrategy.

Following termination or completion of the penetration testingcampaigns, at step S304 the penetration testing system reports at leastone security vulnerability determined to exist in the networked systemby the execution of the penetration testing campaigns, for example byreporting module 230 of FIG. 3. The reporting comprises at least one of:

-   -   (i) causing a display device to display a report containing        information about the security vulnerability,    -   (ii) storing the report containing information about the        security vulnerability in a file, and    -   (iii) electronically transmitting (e.g. over a computer network)        the report containing information about the security        vulnerability.

In one example, in which the reporting at step S304 comprises causing adisplay device to display a report containing information about thesecurity vulnerability, a computing device that performs the reportingcauses a local display device (e.g. either residing in a common housingwith the computing device that performs the reporting or connected via alocal device interface) to display the report.

Alternatively or additionally, information about the securityvulnerability may be sent to another computing device (e.g. incommunication with the computing device that performs the reporting viaa local or remote network) to cause the other computing device todisplay the report on a display device local to the other computingdevice or to store it in a storage device for later use.

In some embodiments, the reporting may be in real time or substantiallyin real time. Alternatively, the reporting may be a delayed reportingwhere the data is first stored in volatile and/or non-volatile memory ofthe computing device that performs the reporting, and the reporting stepmay be completed only after some delay (e.g. even a delay of weeks ormonths or years).

In some embodiments, a step S310 may precede step S300, as seen in FIG.4A. In step S310 the penetration testing system receives one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly instructing the penetration testingsystem to enter a mode in which selection of a plurality of lateralmovement strategies and execution of a plurality of correspondingpenetration testing campaigns, are enabled. The inputs may be providedby the user via a user interface, such as user interface 240 of FIG. 3.An example of step S310 is described hereinbelow with reference to FIG.5.

In other embodiments, the system may, by default, select a plurality oflateral movement strategies and run a corresponding plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns.

In some embodiments, the number of lateral movement strategies selectedat step S300 is pre-defined by a vendor of the penetration testingsystem. In some embodiments, the number of lateral movement strategiesselected at step S300 is dependent on a value of an information item ofthe penetration testing campaigns. For example, for a campaign having agoal of compromising all nodes in the network, the order in which themultiple nodes are accessed may be less significant, and then a smallernumber of lateral movement strategies may be selected, whereas when thesuccess of achieving the goal may be greatly affected by the lateralmovement strategy, for example when attempting to export a specific fileor to compromise a specific node, a greater number of lateral movementstrategies may be selected.

As seen in FIG. 4A, in some embodiments, a step S311 may precede stepS300, in which the penetration testing system receives one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly defining the number of lateralmovement strategies to be selected at step S300. The inputs may beprovided by the user via a user interface, such as user interface 240 ofFIG. 3. An example of step S311 is described hereinbelow with referenceto FIG. 6.

In some embodiments, the group of two or more lateral movementstrategies available for selection at step S300 is pre-defined by avendor of the penetration testing system. This is the defaultimplementation assumed by step S300 in embodiments in which step S312 isnot implemented.

However, in other embodiments, the group of two or more lateral movementstrategies available for selection by the penetration testing system isdetermined at step S312, prior to step S300, as seen in FIG. 4A.

In some such embodiments, such determination is carried out by stepS314, in which the group of two or more lateral movement strategiesavailable for selection is determined based on a value of an informationitem of the penetration testing campaigns to be executed. For example,if the goal of the penetration testing campaigns is to retrieve aspecific file, available lateral movement strategies may be those thatpromote, or facilitate, finding a specific file rapidly, withoutexploring the entire network.

In other embodiments, the determination of the group of two or morelateral movement strategies available for selection is carried out by auser. In such embodiments, in step S316, the penetration testing systemdisplays to the user, for example via user interface 240 of FIG. 3, asecond group of two or more lateral movement strategies. Subsequently,in step S318, the penetration testing system receives one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly selecting a sub-group of the secondgroup of two or more lateral movement strategies. For example, theinputs may be provided via user interface 240 of FIG. 3. In step S320the group of two or more lateral movement strategies from which theplurality of lateral movement strategies are selected in step S300 isdefined to be the selected sub-group of the second group of two or morelateral movement strategies.

Specific examples of step S312 are discussed below with reference toFIG. 7.

In some embodiments, the selection of the lateral movement strategies atstep S300 may be carried out automatically, by the penetration testingsystem. In some such embodiments, the lateral movement strategies may beautomatically selected based on a value of an information item of theplanned campaigns, as illustrated in step S322 of FIG. 4B. For example,if the goal of the campaign is to compromise a specific node, the systemwould select strategies which are more directional, and can try to reachthe specific node more rapidly. By contrast, if the goal is tocompromise all the nodes in the system, the selected lateral movementstrategies may be ones that ensure the rapidest coverage of all thenodes.

In other embodiments, the selection of the lateral movement strategiesat step S300 may be an automatic and random selection, as illustrated instep S324 of FIG. 4B.

However, in yet other embodiments, selection of the lateral movementstrategies at step S300 is carried out by a user. In such embodiments,in step S326, the penetration testing system displays to the user, forexample via user interface 240 of FIG. 3, the group of two or morelateral movement strategies available for use by the penetration testingsystem. This may be carried out regardless of the mode in which thegroup was determined. Subsequently, in step S328, the penetrationtesting system receives one or more manually-entered inputs explicitlyselecting a sub-group of the group of two or more available lateralmovement strategies. For example, the inputs may be provided via userinterface 240 of FIG. 3. In step S330 the lateral movement strategies inthe selected sub-group are defined to be the selected plurality oflateral movement strategies.

Specific examples of implementation of step S300 by steps S326, S328,and S330 are discussed below with reference to FIG. 8.

In some embodiments, step S302 includes executing at least twopenetration testing campaigns of the plurality of penetration testingcampaigns in parallel. This may be particularly suitable when the atleast two penetration testing campaigns use simulated penetrationtesting or reconnaissance agent penetration testing, as explainedhereinabove.

In some embodiments, step S302 includes executing at least twopenetration testing campaigns of the plurality of penetration testingcampaigns in series. This may be particularly suitable when the at leasttwo penetration testing campaigns use actual attack penetration testing,since serial execution ensures that different campaigns cannot interferewith each other.

In some embodiments in which the penetration testing campaigns are runin series, the penetration testing campaigns are executed according toan order of the corresponding lateral movement strategies. In someembodiments, the order is predefined by a vendor of the penetrationtesting system. In other embodiments, the order is a random orderdetermined at the time of execution of the campaigns.

In some embodiments, prior to executing the penetration testingcampaigns, a corresponding time limit is assigned to each penetrationtesting campaign, such that the execution time of each penetrationtesting campaign of the plurality of penetration testing campaigns islimited by the corresponding time limit.

In some embodiments, different time limits are assigned to at least twoof the penetration testing campaigns, or to each of the penetrationtesting campaigns. In other embodiments, the time limit assigned to allof the penetration testing campaigns are the same.

In some embodiments, all the penetration testing campaigns are executedto completion, regardless of any interim results thereof. In otherembodiments, following a determination by one or more of the penetrationtesting campaigns that at least one security vulnerability exists in thenetworked system, the penetration testing campaigns may be changed. Suchchanges may include aborting all penetration testing campaigns runningat the time of making the determination, and/or cancelling execution ofall penetration testing campaigns scheduled to be executed that have notyet started execution.

Reference is now made to FIG. 5, which illustrates an example of userengagements of a user interface for receiving one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly instructing the penetration testingsystem to enter a mode in which selection of a plurality of lateralmovement strategies and execution of a plurality of correspondingpenetration testing campaigns, are enabled, as disclosed in step S310 ofFIG. 4A.

In the example presented in FIG. 5, a GUI element 400 allows the user tomanually and explicitly select between enabling use of multiple lateralmovement strategies, and disabling use of multiple lateral movementstrategies, in which case a single lateral movement strategy is used. Inthe embodiment illustrated in FIG. 5, the user may select whether toenable use of multiple lateral movement strategies using a first radiobutton 402, or to disable such use using a second radio button 404.

FIG. 5 present three frames—Frame 1 at time t1, Frame 2 at time t2, andFrame 3 at time t3. In all frames of FIG. 5, UE is an abbreviation for‘user engagement’—this relates to a user engagement of a GUI element.For example, the user provides a mouse click (e.g. depressing a mousebutton) when a mouse pointer is located in a specific location of theGUI element. The skilled artisan will appreciate that a mouse click isjust one example of a user engagement of a GUI element or portionthereof. In another example, a mouse-pointer points to an elementwithout any need for a mouse-click; in another example, a user toucheswith his or her finger (or with a stylus) a GUI element for ‘userengagement’.

In Frame 1, no selection has yet been made by the user, and the defaultvalue of the system is selected. In the illustrated embodiment, thedefault value is for disabling use of multiple lateral movementstrategies, and as such, in Frame 1, radio button 404 is selected.

In Frame 2, at time t2 the user selects to enable use of multiplelateral movement strategies—e.g. the user engagement of radio button 402of GUI element 400 may be provided by a mouse-click.

In Frame 3, at time t3 when the user's mouse-pointer is located within a‘Confirm’ button 406 of the GUI, the user provides a mouse-click,thereby confirming his selection and facilitating the next step insetting up the penetration testing campaigns and/or triggering of stepsS300 to S304 of the method of FIG. 4B.

It is appreciated that, in some embodiments, steps S300 to S304 maybegin execution immediately after the user clicking the ‘Confirm’ button406, in which case the number of lateral movement strategies selected atstep S300, the group of available lateral movement strategies, and theactual selection at step S300 may be automatically selected by thesystem, as described hereinabove.

In other embodiments, clicking of the ‘Confirm’ button may trigger stepsS311 and/or S312 to be executed prior to execution of steps S300 toS304. In such embodiments, following user interaction with the ‘Confirm’button 406, the user may be presented with another GUI element, forexample as described herein with respect to FIGS. 6 and 7.

Reference is now made to FIG. 6, which illustrates an example of userengagements of a user interface for receiving one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly providing to the penetration testingsystem a number of lateral movement strategies to be selected at stepS300, as disclosed in step S311 of FIG. 4A.

In the example presented in FIG. 6, a GUI element 450 allows the user tomanually and explicitly select the number of lateral movement strategiesthat will be used by the penetration testing system. In the embodimentillustrated in FIG. 6, the user may enter any desired positive number oflateral movement strategies in a text box 452. In the case that the userenters a number greater than the number of available lateral movementstrategies, the system may use all the available lateral movementstrategies.

In other embodiments, not illustrated, the user may select the desirednumber of lateral movement strategies from a suitable list, for exampleprovided as radio buttons or in a drop down menu, so as to ensure thatthe user does not select a number greater than the number of availablelateral movement strategies.

FIG. 6 present three frames—Frame 1 at time t1, Frame 2 at time t2, andFrame 3 at time t3. In all frames of FIG. 6, UE is an abbreviation for‘user engagement’—as described hereinabove with respect to FIG. 5.

In Frame 1, no selection has yet been made by the user, and the defaultvalue of the system is selected. In the illustrated embodiment, thedefault value is for using a single lateral movement strategy, and assuch, in Frame 1, the number 1 appears in text box 452. However, inorder to demonstrate to the user that this is a default selection andmay be changed by the user, the number 1 appears in a different shade orfont, here illustrated as a different font from the rest of the userinterface, and indicated by italics.

In Frame 2, at time t2 the user selects to use three lateral movementstrategies—e.g. the user engagement of text box 452 of GUI element 450to add the numeral 3 therein may be provided by a keyboard.

In Frame 3, at time t3 when the user's mouse-pointer is located within a‘Confirm’ button 456 of the GUI, the user provides a mouse-click,thereby confirming his selection and facilitating the next step insetting up the penetration testing campaigns and/or triggering of stepsS300 to S304 of the method of FIG. 4B.

It is appreciated that steps S300 to S304 may begin executionimmediately after the user clicking the ‘Confirm’ button 456, in whichcase the group of available lateral movement strategies, and the actualselection at step S300 may be automatically selected by the system, asdescribed hereinabove.

In other embodiments, clicking of the ‘Confirm’ button 456 may triggerstep S312 to be executed prior to execution of steps S300 to S304. Insuch embodiments, following user interaction with the ‘Confirm’ button456, the user may be presented with another GUI element, for example asdescribed herein with respect to FIG. 7.

In some embodiments, the user engagement illustrated in FIG. 6 may occurimmediately after the user engagement illustrated in FIG. 5. Forexample, if in FIG. 5 the user clicks radio button 402 indicating thatuse of multiple lateral movement strategies should be enabled, the userinterface may then respond by presenting the user with the text box 452of FIG. 6, for the user to determine the number of lateral movementstrategies to be selected.

Reference is now made to FIG. 7, which illustrates an example of userengagements of a user interface for receiving one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly identifying which lateral movementstrategies will be available for selection by the penetration testingsystem in step S300, as disclosed in steps S316-S320 of FIG. 4A.

In the example presented in FIG. 7, a GUI element 500 allows the user tomanually and explicitly select lateral movement strategies which will beavailable for selection by the penetration testing system in step S300.In the embodiment illustrated in FIG. 7, the user may select one or morepre-defined available lateral movement strategies using one or morecheckboxes 502.

FIG. 7 present three frames—Frame 1 at time t1, Frame 2 at time t2, andFrame 3 at time t3. In all frames of FIG. 7, UE is an abbreviation for‘user engagement’—as described hereinabove with respect to FIG. 5.

In Frame 1, no selection has yet been made by the user, and the defaultvalue of the system is selected. In the illustrated example, it isassumed that the number 3 was selected in the user engagement of FIG. 6.In such a case, the default value may be selection of the first threeavailable lateral movement strategies, and as such, in Frame 1, thecheckboxes indicating ‘BFS’, ‘DFS’, and ‘shortest distance to CEO node’are selected. However, in other embodiments, in which the userengagement of FIG. 7 does not follow the user engagement of FIG. 6, thedefault selection may be of a single lateral movement strategy.

In Frame 2, at time t2 the user selects specific lateral movementstrategies to be available for selection by the penetration testingsystem (for example when executing step S300 of the method of FIG.4B)—e.g. the user engagement of checkboxes 502 of GUI element 500 may beprovided by mouse-clicks. The user may choose to unselect defaultselections and add other lateral movement strategies by selectingadditional checkboxes. In the illustrated embodiment, the user has keptthe default selection of ‘BFS’ and ‘DFS’, has unselected the defaultselection of ‘shortest distance to CEO node’, and has additionallyselected two other lateral movement strategies by user engagement of thecheckboxes 502 thereof.

In Frame 3, at time t3 when the user's mouse-pointer is located within a‘Confirm’ button 506 of the GUI, the user provides a mouse-click,thereby triggering steps S300 to S304 of the method of FIG. 4B, wherethe group of lateral movement strategies available for selection by thepenetration testing system at step S300 are those whose correspondingcheck-boxes were selected at time t3.

In some embodiments, the user interface is programmed such that when theuser selects more than one lateral movement strategy, use of multiplelateral movement strategies in multiple penetration testing campaigns isautomatically enabled. In some such embodiments, selection of multiplelateral movement strategies in Frame 2 may obviate the need for stepS310, and may trigger a message notifying the user that use of multiplelateral movement strategies is enabled.

In some embodiments, the user engagement illustrated in FIG. 7 may occurimmediately after the user engagement illustrated in FIG. 5 or in FIG.6. For example, if in FIG. 5 the user clicks radio button 402 indicatingthat use of multiple lateral movement strategies should be enabled, theuser interface may then in response present the user with the list ofcheckboxes 502 of FIG. 7, for the user to determine the list of lateralmovement strategies available for selection.

As another example, if in FIG. 6 the user enters into text box 452 anumber greater than 1, in response the user interface may present theuser with the list of checkboxes 502 of FIG. 7, for the user todetermine the list of lateral movement strategies available forselection. In some such embodiments, the user interface may beprogrammed such that the user is required to select at least the enterednumber of lateral movement strategies to be used, in order to facilitateselection by the system of that number of lateral movement strategies.In some such embodiments, Frame 2 may include a message prompting theuser to select at least the entered number of lateral movementstrategies. In some such embodiments, user engagement with ‘Confirm’button 506 may be blocked or prevented, until the user selects asuitable number of lateral movement strategies.

Reference is now made to FIG. 8, which illustrates an example of userengagements of a user interface for receiving one or moremanually-entered inputs explicitly selecting the lateral movementstrategies to be used, as disclosed in sub-steps S326-S330 of step S300of FIG. 4B.

In the example presented in FIG. 8, a GUI element 550 allows the user tomanually and explicitly select lateral movement strategies which will beused in multiple penetration testing campaigns by the penetrationtesting system. In the embodiment illustrated in FIG. 8, the user mayselect one or more of available lateral movement strategies using one ormore checkboxes 552. The available lateral movement strategies may bepre-defined, for example by a vendor of the penetration testing system,or may be previously selected by the user, as described hereinabove withrespect to FIG. 7. In the illustrated embodiment of FIG. 8, theavailable lateral movement strategies are those selected by the userengagement of FIG. 7.

FIG. 8 present three frames—Frame 1 at time t1, Frame 2 at time t2, andFrame 3 at time t3. In all frames of FIG. 8, UE is an abbreviation for‘user engagement’—as described hereinabove with respect to FIG. 5.

In Frame 1, no selection has yet been made by the user, and the defaultvalue of the system is selected. In the illustrated example, it isassumed that the number 3 was selected in the user engagement of FIG. 6.In such a case, the default value may be selection of the first threeavailable lateral movement strategies, and as such, in Frame 1, thecheckboxes indicating ‘BFS’, ‘DFS’, and ‘shortest distance to specificresource’ are selected. However, in other embodiments, in which the userengagement of FIG. 8 does not follow the user engagement of FIG. 5 or ofFIG. 6, the default selection may be of a single lateral movementstrategy.

In Frame 2, at time t2 the user selects specific lateral movementstrategies to be used in penetration testing campaigns by thepenetration testing system when executing step S302 of the method ofFIG. 4B—e.g. the user engagement of checkboxes 552 of GUI element 550may be provided by mouse-clicks. The user may choose to unselect one ormore default selections, and to add additional lateral movementstrategies by selecting additional checkboxes. In the illustratedexample, the user has kept the default selection of ‘BFS’ and ‘DFS’, hasunselected the default selection of ‘shortest distance to specificresource’, and has additionally selected one other lateral movementstrategy by user engagement of the checkbox 552 thereof.

In Frame 3, at time t3 when the user's mouse-pointer is located within a‘Confirm’ button 556 of the GUI, the user provides a mouse-click,thereby triggering steps S302 to S304 of the method of FIG. 4B, wherethe lateral movement strategies selected by the penetration testingsystem at step S300 are those whose corresponding check-boxes wereselected at time t3.

In some embodiments, the user interface is programmed such that when theuser selects more than one lateral movement strategy, use of multiplelateral movement strategies in multiple penetration testing campaigns isautomatically enabled, and the number of penetration testing campaignsto be executed is automatically determined. In some such embodiments,selection of multiple lateral movement strategies in Frame 2 may obviatethe need for steps S310 and/or S311, and may trigger a message notifyingthe user that multiple lateral movement strategies are being used.

In some embodiments, the user engagement illustrated in FIG. 8 may occurimmediately after the user engagements illustrated in FIG. 5, FIG. 6, orFIG. 7. For example, if in FIG. 5 the user clicks radio button 402indicating that use of multiple lateral movement strategies should beenabled and the group of available lateral movement strategies ispre-defined, then the user interface may then present the user with thelist of checkboxes 552 of FIG. 8, for the user to select the lateralmovement strategies to be used.

As another example, if in FIG. 6 the user enters into text box 452 anumber greater than 1 and the group of available lateral movementstrategies is pre-defined, the user interface may then present the userwith the list of checkboxes 552 of FIG. 8, for the user to select thelateral movement strategies to be used. In some such embodiments, theuser interface may be programmed such that the user is required toselect a number of lateral movement strategies entered in text box 452.In some such embodiments, Frame 2 may include a message prompting theuser to select the entered number of lateral movement strategies. Insome such embodiments, user engagement with ‘Confirm’ button 556 may beblocked or prevented, until the user selects a suitable number oflateral movement strategies.

As a further example, if in FIG. 7 the user selects specific lateralmovement strategies to be available by clicking check boxes 502, theuser interface may then present the user only with those checkboxes 502selected by the user in FIG. 7 as the list of checkboxes 552 of FIG. 8,as seen from comparison of FIGS. 7 and 8 herein.

Definitions

This disclosure should be interpreted according to the definitionsbelow. In case of a contradiction between the definitions in thisDefinitions section and other sections of this disclosure, this sectionshould prevail.

In case of a contradiction between the definitions in this section and adefinition or a description in any other document, including in anotherdocument included in this disclosure by reference, this section shouldprevail, even if the definition or the description in the other documentis commonly accepted by a person of ordinary skill in the art.

-   -   1. “computing device”—Any device having a processing unit into        which it is possible to install code that can be executed by the        processing unit. The installation of the code may be possible        even while the device is operative in the field or it may be        possible only in the factory.    -   2. “peripheral device”—Any device, whether a computing device or        not, that provides input or output services to at least one        other device that is a computing device. Examples of peripheral        devices are printers, plotters, scanners, environmental sensors,        smart-home controllers, digital cameras, speakers and display        screens. A peripheral device may be directly connected to a        single computing device or may be connected to a communication        system through which it can communicate with one or more        computing devices. A storage device that is (i) not included in        or directly connected to a single computing device, and (ii)        accessible by multiple computing devices, is a peripheral        device.    -   3. “network” or “computing network”—A collection of computing        devices and peripheral devices which are all connected to common        communication means that allow direct communication between any        two of the devices without requiring passing the communicated        data through a third device. The network includes both the        connected devices and the communication means. A network may be        wired or wireless or partially wired and partially wireless.    -   4. “networked system” or “networked computing system”—One or        more networks that are interconnected so that communication is        possible between any two devices of the one or more networks,        even if they do not belong to the same network. The connection        between different networks of the networked system may be        achieved through dedicated computing devices, and/or through        computing devices that belong to multiple networks of the        networked system and also have other functionality in addition        to connecting between networks. The networked system includes        the one or more networks, any connecting computing devices and        also peripheral devices accessible by any computing device of        the networked system. Note that a single network is a networked        system having only one network, and therefore a network is a        special case of a networked system.    -   5. “module”—A portion of a system that implements a specific        task. A module may be composed of hardware, software or any        combination of both. For example, in a module composed of both        hardware and software, the hardware may include a portion of a        computing device, a single computing device or multiple        computing devices, and the software may include software code        executed by the portion of the computing device, by the single        computing device or by the multiple computing devices. A        computing device associated with a module may include one or        more processors and computer readable storage medium        (non-transitory, transitory or a combination of both) for        storing instructions or for executing instructions by the one or        more processors.    -   6. “network node of a networked system” or “node of a networked        system”—Any computing device or peripheral device that belongs        to the networked system.    -   7. “security vulnerability of a network node” or “vulnerability        of a network node”—A weakness which allows an attacker to        compromise the network node. A vulnerability of a network node        may be caused by one or more of a flawed configuration of a        component of the network node, a flawed setting of a software        module in the network node, a bug in a software module in the        network node, a human error while operating the network node,        having trust in an already-compromised other network node, and        the like.        -   A weakness that allows an attacker to compromise a network            node only conditionally, depending on current conditions in            the network node or in the networked system in which the            network node resides, is still a vulnerability of the            network node, but may also be referred to as a “potential            vulnerability of the network node”. For example, a            vulnerability that compromises any network node running the            Windows 7 Operating System, but only if the network node            receives messages through a certain Internet port, can be            said to be a vulnerability of any Windows 7 network node,            and can also be said to be a potential vulnerability of any            such node. Note that in this example the potential            vulnerability may fail in compromising the node either            because the certain port is not open (a condition in the            node) or because a firewall is blocking messages from            reaching the certain port in the node (a condition of the            networked system).    -   8. “security vulnerability of a networked system” or        “vulnerability of a networked system”—A weakness which allows an        attacker to compromise the networked system. A vulnerability of        a networked system may be caused by one or more of a        vulnerability of a network node of the networked system, a        flawed configuration of a component of the networked system, a        flawed setting of a software module in the networked system, a        bug in a software module in the networked system, a human error        while operating the networked system, and the like.        -   A weakness that allows an attacker to compromise a networked            system only conditionally, depending on current conditions            in the networked system, is still a vulnerability of the            networked system, but may also be referred to as a            “potential vulnerability of the networked system”. For            example, if a network node of the networked system has a            potential vulnerability then that vulnerability can be said            to be a vulnerability of the networked system, and can also            be said to be a potential vulnerability of the networked            system.    -   9. “validating a vulnerability” or “validating a potential        vulnerability” (for a given network node or for a given        networked system)—Verifying that the vulnerability compromises        the given network node or the given networked system under the        conditions currently existing in the given network node or the        given networked system.        -   The validation of the vulnerability may be achieved by            actively attempting to compromise the given network node or            the given networked system and then checking if the            compromising attempt was successful. Such validation is            referred to as “active validation”.        -   Alternatively, the validation of the vulnerability may be            achieved by simulating the exploitation of the vulnerability            or by otherwise evaluating the results of such exploitation            without actively attempting to compromise the given network            node or the given networked system. Such validation is            referred to as “passive validation”.    -   10. “vulnerability management”—A cyclical practice of        identifying, classifying, remediating, and mitigating        vulnerabilities of network nodes in a networked system.    -   11. “penetration testing” or “pen testing” (in some references        also known as “red team assessment” or “red team testing”, but        in other references those terms referring to a red team have a        different meaning than “penetration testing”)—A process in which        a networked system is evaluated in order to determine if it can        be compromised by an attacker by utilizing one or more security        vulnerabilities of the networked system. If it is determined        that the networked system can be compromised, then the one or        more security vulnerabilities of the networked system are        identified and reported.        -   Unlike a vulnerability management process which operates at            the level of isolated vulnerabilities of individual network            nodes, a penetration test may operate at a higher level            which considers vulnerabilities of multiple network nodes            that might be jointly used by an attacker to compromise the            networked system.        -   A penetration testing process involves at least the            following functions: (i) a reconnaissance function, (ii) an            attack function, and (iii) a reporting function. It should            be noted that the above functions do not necessarily operate            sequentially according to the above order, but may operate            in parallel or in an interleaved mode.        -   Unless otherwise explicitly specified, a reference to            penetration testing should be understood as referring to            automated penetration testing.    -   12. “automated penetration testing”—Penetration testing in which        at least one of the reconnaissance function, the attack function        and the reporting function is at least partially automated.    -   13. “penetration testing system”—A system capable of performing        penetration testing, regardless if composed of hardware,        software or combination of both.    -   14. “reconnaissance function” or “recon function”—The function        in a penetration testing process that handles collection of data        about the tested networked system. The collected data may        include internal data of one or more network nodes of the tested        networked system. Additionally, the collected data may include        data about communication means of the tested networked system        and about peripheral devices of the tested networked system. The        collected data may also include data that is only indirectly        related to the tested networked system, for example business        intelligence data about the organization owning the tested        networked system, collected in order to use it for assessing        importance of resources of the networked system.        -   The functionality of a reconnaissance function may be            implemented by any combination of (i) software executing in            a remote computing device, where the remote computing device            may probe the tested networked system for the purpose of            collecting data about it, (ii) hardware and/or software            simulating or duplicating the tested networked system, (iii)            a reconnaissance agent software module executing in one or            more network nodes of the tested networked system.    -   15. “attack function”—The function in a penetration testing        process that handles determination of whether one or more        security vulnerabilities exist in the tested networked system.        The determination is based on data collected by the        reconnaissance function of the penetration testing. The attack        function generates data about each of the identified security        vulnerabilities, if any.        -   The functionality of an attack function may be implemented            by any combination of (i) software executing in a remote            computing device, where the remote computing device may            attack the tested networked system for the purpose of            verifying that it can be compromised, (ii) hardware and/or            software simulating or duplicating the tested networked            system, (iii) an attack agent software module executing in            one or more network nodes of the tested networked system.        -   The methods used by an attack function may include executing            a real attack on the tested networked system by attempting            to change at least one setting, mode or state of a network            node or of a hardware or software component of a network            node, in order to verify that the tested networked system            may be compromised. In such case, the attempt may result in            actually compromising the tested networked system.            Alternatively, the methods used by an attack function may be            such that whenever there is a need to verify whether a            setting, a mode or a state of a network node or of a            hardware or software component of a network node can be            changed in a way that compromises the tested networked            system, the verification is done by simulating the effects            of the change or by otherwise evaluating them without ever            actually compromising the tested networked system.    -   16. “reporting function”—The function in a penetration testing        process that handles reporting of results of the penetration        testing. The reporting comprises at least one of (i) causing a        display device to display a report including information about        the results of the penetration testing, (ii) recording a report        including information about the results of the penetration        testing in a file, and (iii) electronically transmitting a        report including information about the results of the        penetration testing.        -   The functionality of a reporting function may be implemented            by software executing in a remote computing device, for            example in the computing device implementing the attack            function of the penetration testing.    -   17. “recovery function” or “clean-up function”—The function in a        penetration testing process that handles cleaning-up after a        penetration test. The recovery includes undoing any operation        done during the penetration testing process that results in        compromising the tested networked system.        -   The functionality of a recovery function may be implemented            by any combination of (i) software executing in a remote            computing device, for example in the computing device            implementing the attack function of the penetration            testing, (ii) an attack agent software module executing in            one or more network nodes of the tested networked system.    -   18. “a campaign of penetration testing” or “penetration testing        campaign”—A specific run of a specific test of a specific        networked system by the penetration testing system.    -   19. “results of a penetration testing campaign”—Any output        generated by the penetration testing campaign. This includes,        among other things, data about any security vulnerability of the        networked system tested by the penetration testing campaign that        is detected by the campaign. It should be noted that in this        context the word “results” is used in its plural form regardless        of the amount of output data generated by the penetration        testing campaign, including when the output consists of data        about a single security vulnerability.    -   20. “information item of a campaign”—A variable data item that a        penetration testing system must know its value before executing        the campaign. Note that a data item must be able to have        different values at different campaigns in order to be        considered an information item of the campaign. If a data item        always has the same value for all campaigns, it is not an        information item of the campaign, even if it must be known and        is being used by the penetration testing system when executing        the campaign.        -   An information item of a campaign is either a primary            information item of the campaign or a secondary information            item of the campaign.        -   A type of an attacker and a goal of an attacker are examples            of information items of a campaign. Another example of an            information item of a campaign that is more complex than the            previous two simple examples is a subset of the network            nodes of the networked system that is assumed to be already            compromised at the time of beginning the penetration testing            campaign, with the subset defined either by an explicit            selection of network nodes or by a Boolean condition each            node of the subset has to satisfy.        -   A value of an information item may be composed either of a            simple value or of both a main value and one or more            auxiliary values. If a specific main value of an information            item requires one or more auxiliary values that complete the            full characterization of the value, then the combination of            the main value and the one or more auxiliary values together            is considered to be the value assigned to the information            item. For example, for a “goal of the attacker” information            item, after a user selects a main value of “exporting a            specific file from whatever node having a copy of it”, the            user still has to provide a file name as an auxiliary value            in order for the goal information item to be fully            characterized. In this case the combination of “exporting a            specific file from whatever node having a copy of it” and            the specific file name is considered to be the value of the            “goal of the attacker” information item.    -   21. “primary information item of a campaign”—An information item        of the campaign which is completely independent of previously        selected values of other information items of the campaign. In        other words, the options available to a user for selecting the        value of a primary information item of the campaign are not        dependent on any value previously selected for any another        information item of the campaign. For example, the options        available to the user for selecting a goal of the attacker are        independent of values previously selected for any other        information item of the campaign, and therefore the goal of the        attacker is a primary information item of the campaign.    -   22. “secondary information item of a campaign”—An information        item of the campaign which depends on at least one previously        selected value of another information item of the campaign. In        other words, the options available to a user for selecting the        value of a secondary information item of the campaign depend on        at least one value previously selected for another information        item of the campaign. For example, the options available to the        user for selecting a capability of an attacker may depend on the        previously selected value of the type of the attacker. For a        first type of attacker the available capabilities to select from        may be a first group of capabilities, while for a second type of        attacker the available capabilities to select from may be a        second group of capabilities, different from the first group.        Therefore, a capability of the attacker is a secondary        information item of the campaign.    -   23. “specifications of a campaign” or “scenario”—A collection of        values assigned to all information items of the campaign. As        having a value for each information item of a campaign is        essential for running it, a campaign of a penetration testing        system cannot be run without providing the penetration testing        system with full specifications of the campaign. A value of an        information item included in the specifications of a campaign        may be manually selected by a user or may be automatically        determined by the penetration testing system. In the latter        case, the automatic determination by the system may depend on        one or more values selected by the user for one or more        information items of the campaign, or it may be independent of        any selection by the user. For example, the selection of the        capabilities of the attacker may automatically be determined by        the system based on the user-selected type of the attacker, and        the lateral movement strategy of the attacker may be        automatically determined by the system independently of any user        selection.    -   24. “pre-defined scenario”, “pre-defined test scenario”,        “scenario template” or “template scenario”—A scenario that        exists in storage accessible to a penetration testing system        before the time a campaign is started, and can be selected by a        user of the penetration testing system for defining a campaign        of penetration testing. A pre-defined scenario may be created        and provided by the provider of the penetration testing system        and may be part of a library of multiple pre-defined scenarios.        Alternatively, a pre-defined scenario may be created by the user        of the penetration testing system using a scenario editor        provided by the provider of the penetration testing system.        -   A penetration testing system may require that a campaign of            penetration testing that is based on a pre-defined scenario            must have all its values of information items taken from the            pre-defined scenario, with no exceptions. Alternatively, a            penetration testing system may allow a user to select a            pre-defined scenario and then override and change one or            more values of information items of a campaign that is based            on the pre-defined scenario.    -   25. “attacker” or “threat actor”—An entity, whether a single        person, a group of persons or an organization, that might        conduct an attack against a networked system by penetrating it        for uncovering its security vulnerabilities and/or for        compromising it.    -   26. “a type of an attacker”—A classification of the attacker        that indicates its main incentive in conducting attacks of        networked systems. Typical values for a type of an attacker are        state-sponsored, opportunistic cyber criminal, organized cyber        criminal and insider.        -   An attacker can have only a single type.    -   27. “a capability of an attacker”—A tool in the toolbox of the        attacker. A capability describes a specific action that the        attacker can perform. Examples of capabilities are copying a        local file of a network node and exporting it to the attacker        out of the networked system and remotely collecting database        information from an SQL server of the networked system. In some        systems, selecting a type of an attacker causes a corresponding        default selection of capabilities for that type of attacker, but        the user may have an option to override the default selection        and add or delete capabilities.        -   An attacker can have one or multiple capabilities.    -   28. “a goal of an attacker”—What the attacker of a campaign is        trying to achieve when attacking a targeted networked system. In        other words, what is the criterion according to which it will be        judged whether the attack was a success or a failure and/or to        what extent was it a success or a failure. Selecting a type of        an attacker may cause a default selection of a goal for that        attacker, but the user may have an option to override the        default selection. An attacker can have one or multiple goals.    -   29. “a lateral movement strategy of an attacker”—A decision        logic applied by the attacker of a campaign for selecting the        next network node to try to compromise. During a penetration        testing campaign, the attacker is assumed to make progress by an        iterative process in which in each iteration he selects the next        node to attack, based on the group of network nodes he already        controls (i.e. that are already compromised). If the attack on        the selected node is successful, that node is added to the group        of nodes that are already compromised, and another iteration        starts. If the attempt to compromise the selected node fails,        another node is selected, either according to some other rule or        randomly.        -   It should be noted that all types of penetration testing            systems, whether using simulated penetration testing, actual            attack penetration testing or some other form of penetration            testing, must use a lateral movement strategy. In the case            of a penetration testing system that actually attacks the            tested networked system, the lateral movement strategy            selects the path of attack actually taken through the            networked system. In the case of a penetration testing            system that simulates or evaluates the results of attacking            the tested networked system, the lateral movement strategy            selects the path of attack taken in the simulation or the            evaluation through the networked system. Therefore in the            above explanation, the term “attack” should be understood to            mean “actual attack or simulated attack”, the term “already            controls” should be understood to mean “already controls or            already determined to be able to control”, the term “already            compromised” should be understood to mean “already            compromised or already determined to be comprisable”, etc.        -   A simple example of a lateral movement strategy is a “depth            first” strategy. In such strategy, the next network node to            try to compromise is an immediate neighbor of the last            network node that was compromised that is not yet            compromised (provided such neighbor node exists). Two            network nodes are “immediate neighbors” of each other if and            only if they have a direct communication link between them            that does not pass through any other network node.        -   Another simple example is a “breadth search” strategy. In            such strategy, the next network node to try to compromise is            a network node whose distance from the first node            compromised by the campaign is the smallest possible. The            distance between two network nodes is the number of network            nodes along the shortest path between them, plus one. A path            is an ordered list of network nodes in which each pair of            adjacent nodes in the list is a pair of immediate neighbors.            Thus, the distance between two immediate neighbors is one.        -   An example of a more advanced lateral movement strategy is a            strategy that is applicable when a goal of the attacker is            related to a resource of the networked system that resides            in a specific network node. In such case the next network            node to try to compromise may be selected by determining the            shortest path in the networked system leading from an            already compromised node to the specific node containing the            desired resource, and picking the first node on this path to            be the next node to try to compromise. Note that if the            shortest path has a length of one (which happens when the            specific node is an immediate neighbor of an already            compromised node), then the next node to try to compromise            is the specific node containing the desired resource.            Another example of a lateral movement strategy is a strategy            that gives priority to network nodes satisfying a specific            condition, for example nodes that are known to have a            specific weakness, such as running the Windows XP operating            system. In such case the next node to try to compromise is a            node that satisfies the condition and is also an immediate            neighbor of an already compromised node (if such node            exists). Selecting a type of an attacker may cause a default            selection of a lateral movement strategy for that attacker,            but the user may have an option to override the default            selection.        -   An attacker can only have a single lateral movement            strategy.    -   30. “penetration testing by simulation” or “simulated        penetration testing”—Penetration testing in which (i) the        functionality of the reconnaissance function is fully        implemented by software executing by a remote computing device        and/or by hardware and/or software simulating or duplicating the        tested networked system, where the remote computing device may        probe the tested networked system for the purpose of collecting        data about it, as long as this is done without risking        compromising the tested networked system, and (ii) the methods        used by the attack function are such that whenever there is a        need to verify whether a setting, a mode or a state of a network        node or of a hardware or software component of a network node        can be changed in a way that compromises the tested networked        system, the verification is done by simulating the effects of        the change or by otherwise evaluating them without risking        compromising the tested networked system.    -   31. “penetration testing by actual attack” or “actual attack        penetration testing” or “penetration testing by actual exploit”        or “actual exploit penetration testing”—Penetration testing in        which (i) the functionality of the reconnaissance function is        fully implemented by (A) software executing in a remote        computing device, where the remote computing device may probe        the tested networked system for the purpose of collecting data        about it even if this risks compromising the tested networked        system, and/or by (B) software executing in one or more network        nodes of the tested networked system that analyzes network        traffic and network packets of the tested networked system for        collecting data about it, and (ii) the methods used by the        attack function include executing a real attack on the tested        networked system by attempting to change at least one setting,        mode or state of a network node or of a hardware or software        component of a network node in order to verify that the tested        networked system may be compromised, such that the attempt may        result in compromising the tested networked system.    -   32. “penetration testing by reconnaissance agents” or        “reconnaissance agent penetration testing”—Penetration testing        in which (i) the functionality of the reconnaissance function is        at least partially implemented by a reconnaissance agent        software module installed and executed in each one of multiple        network nodes of the tested networked system, where the data        collected by at least one instance of the reconnaissance agent        software module includes internal data of the network node in        which it is installed, and the data collected by at least one        instance of the reconnaissance agent software module is at least        partially collected during the penetration testing process,        and (ii) the methods used by the attack function are such that        whenever there is a need to verify whether a setting, a mode or        a state of a network node or of a hardware or software component        of a network node can be changed in a way that compromises the        tested networked system, this is done by simulating the effects        of the change or by otherwise evaluating them without risking        compromising the tested networked system.    -   33. “reconnaissance client agent”, “reconnaissance agent” or        “recon agent”—A software module that can be installed on a        network node and can be executed by a processor of that network        node for partially or fully implementing the reconnaissance        function of a penetration test. A reconnaissance agent must be        capable, when executed by a processor of the network node in        which it is installed, of collecting data at least about some of        the events occurring in the network node. Such events may be        internal events of the network node or messages sent out of the        network node or received by the network node. A reconnaissance        agent may be capable of collecting data about all types of        internal events of its hosting network node. Additionally, it        may be capable of collecting other types of data of its hosting        network node. A reconnaissance agent may additionally be capable        of collecting data about other network nodes or about other        components of a networked system containing the hosting network        node. A reconnaissance agent may be persistently installed on a        network node, where “persistently” means that once installed on        a network node the reconnaissance agent survives a reboot of the        network node. Alternatively, a reconnaissance agent may be        non-persistently installed on a network node, where        “non-persistently” means that the reconnaissance agent does not        survive a reboot of the network node and consequently should be        installed again on the network node for a new penetration test        in which the network node takes part, if the network node was        rebooted since the previous penetration test in which it took        part.    -   34. “attack client agent” or “attack agent”—A software module        that can be installed on a network node and can be executed by a        processor of that network node for partially or fully        implementing the attack function of a penetration test.        Typically, an attack agent is installed by an actual attack        penetration testing system in a network node that it had        succeeded to compromise during a penetration test. Once        installed on such network node, the attack agent may be used as        a tool for compromising other network nodes in the same        networked system. In such case, the attack agent may include        code that when executed by a processor of the compromised        network node compromises another network node that is adjacent        to it in the networked system, possibly taking advantage of the        high level of trust it may have from the point of view of the        adjacent network node. Another type of an attack agent may        include code that when executed by a processor of a network node        determines whether that network node would be compromised if a        given operation is performed.    -   35. “penetration testing software module” or “remote computing        device penetration testing software module”—A software module        that implements the full functionality of a penetration testing        system, except for the functionality implemented by (i)        reconnaissance agents, (ii) attack agents, and (iii) hardware        and/or software simulating or duplicating the tested networked        system, if such components are used in the implementation of the        penetration testing system. The penetration testing software        module may be installed and executed on a single computing        device or comprise multiple software components that reside on        multiple computing devices. For example, a first component of        the penetration testing software module may implement part or        all of the reconnaissance function and be installed and executed        on a first computing device, a second component of the        penetration testing software module may implement part or all of        the attack function and be installed and executed on a second        computing device, and a third component of the penetration        testing software module may implement the reporting function and        be installed and executed on a third computing device.    -   36. “internal data of a network node”—Data related to the        network node that is only directly accessible to code executing        by a processor of the network node and is only accessible to any        code executing outside of the network node by receiving it from        code executing by a processor of the network node. Examples of        internal data of a network node are data about internal events        of the network node, data about internal conditions of the        network node, and internal factual data of the network node.    -   37. “internal event of/in a network node”—An event occurring in        the network node whose occurrence is only directly detectable by        code executing by a processor of the network node. Examples of        an internal event of a network node are an insertion of a USB        drive into a port of the network node, and a removal of a USB        drive from a port of the network node. An internal event may be        a free event or a non-free event.        -   It should be noted that the term “an event of X” refers to            any occurrence of an event of the type X and not to a            specific occurrence of it. For referring to a specific            occurrence of an event of type X one should explicitly say            “an occurrence of event of X”. Thus, a software module which            looks for detecting insertions of a USB drive into a port is            “detecting an event of USB drive insertion”, while after            that module had detected such event it may report “an            occurrence of an event of USB drive insertion”.    -   38. “internal condition of/in a network node”—A Boolean        condition related to the network node which can only be directly        tested by code executing by a processor of the network node.        Examples of an internal condition of a network node are whether        the local disk of the terminal node is more than 98% full or        not, and whether a USB drive is currently inserted in a port of        the network node.    -   39. “internal factual data of/in a network node” or “internal        facts of a network node”—Facts related to the network node which        can only be directly found by code executing by a processor of        the network node. Examples of factual data of a network node are        the version of the firmware of a solid-state drive installed in        the network node, the hardware version of a processor of the        network node, and the amount of free space in a local disk of        the network node.    -   40. “resource of a networked system”—A file in a network node of        the networked system, a folder in a network node of the        networked system, credentials of a user of the networked system,        a peripheral device of a network node of the networked system,        or a peripheral device directly attached to a network of the        networked system.    -   41. “compromising a network node”—Successfully causing execution        of an operation in the network node that is not allowed for the        entity requesting the operation by the rules defined by an        administrator of the network node, or successfully causing        execution of code in a software module of the network node that        was not predicted by the vendor of the software module. Examples        for compromising a network node are reading a file without        having read permission for it, modifying a file without having        write permission for it, deleting a file without having delete        permission for it, exporting a file out of the network node        without having permission to do so, getting an access right        higher than the one originally assigned without having        permission to get it, getting a priority higher than the one        originally assigned without having permission to get it,        changing a configuration of a firewall network node such that it        allows access to other network nodes that were previously hidden        behind the firewall without having permission to do it, and        causing execution of software code by utilizing a buffer        overflow. As shown by the firewall example, the effects of        compromising a certain network node are not necessarily limited        to that certain network node. In addition, executing successful        ARP spoofing, denial-of-service, man-in-the-middle or        session-hijacking attacks against a network node are also        considered compromising that network node, even if not        satisfying any of the conditions listed above in this        definition.    -   42. “ARP spoofing”—a technique for compromising a target network        node in which an attacker sends a false Address Resolution        Protocol (ARP) reply message to the target network node. The aim        is to associate an attacker's MAC address (either a MAC address        of the node sending the false ARP reply message or a MAC address        of another node controlled by the attacker) with the IP address        of another host, such as the default gateway, causing any        traffic sent by the target node and meant for that IP address to        be sent to the attacker instead. ARP spoofing may allow an        attacker to intercept data frames on a network, modify the        traffic, or stop all traffic to a certain node. Often the attack        is used as an opening for other attacks, such as        denial-of-service, man-in-the-middle, or session-hijacking        attacks.    -   43. “denial-of-service attack”—a cyber-attack where an attacker        seeks to make a service provided by a network node to other        network nodes unavailable to its intended users either        temporarily or indefinitely. The denial-of-service attack may be        accomplished by flooding the node providing the targeted service        with superfluous requests in an attempt to overload it and        prevent some or all legitimate requests from being fulfilled.        Alternatively, the denial-of-service attack may be accomplished        by causing some or all of the legitimate requests addressed to        the targeted service to not reach their destination.    -   44. “man-in-the-middle attack”—a cyber-attack where an attacker        secretly relays and possibly alters the communication between        two network nodes who believe they are directly communicating        with each other. One example of man-in-the-middle attacks is        active eavesdropping, in which the attacker makes independent        connections with the victims and relays messages between them to        make them believe they are communicating directly with each        other, when in fact the entire communication session is        controlled by the attacker. The attacker must be able to        intercept all relevant messages passing between the two victims        and inject new ones.    -   45. “session-hijacking attack”—a cyber-attack where a valid        communication session between two network nodes in a networked        system is used by an attacker to gain unauthorized access to        information or services in the networked computer system.    -   46. “compromising a networked system”—Compromising at least one        network node of the networked system or successfully causing        execution of an operation in the networked system that is not        allowed for the entity requesting the operation by the rules        defined by an administrator of the networked system. Examples        for operations in the networked system that may not be allowed        are exporting a file out of the networked system without having        permission to do so, sending a file to a network printer without        having permission to do so, and copying a file from one network        node to another network node without having permission to do so.    -   47. “compromising a software application”—Successfully causing        the software application to execute an operation that is not        allowed for the entity requesting the operation by the rules        defined by an administrator of the network node on which the        software application is installed or by a vendor of the software        application, or successfully causing the execution of code in        the software application that was not predicted by the vendor of        the software application. Examples for compromising a software        application are changing a configuration file controlling the        operation of the software application without having permission        for doing so, and activating a privileged function of the        software application without having permission for doing so. In        addition, causing the software application to execute a macro        without checking rights of the macro code to do what it is        attempting to do is also considered compromising that software        application, even if not satisfying any of the conditions listed        above in this definition.    -   48 “administrator of a network node”—Any person that is        authorized, among other things, to define or change at least one        rule controlling at least one of an access right, a permission,        a priority and a configuration in the network node.    -   49 “administrator of a networked system”—Any person that is        authorized, among other things, to define or change at least one        rule controlling at least one of an access right, a permission,        a priority and a configuration in the networked system. Note        that an administrator of a networked system may also be an        administrator of one or more of the network nodes of the        networked system.    -   50. “remote computing device” or “penetration testing remote        computing device” (with respect to a given networked system)—A        computing device that executes software implementing part or all        of the penetration testing software module that is used for        testing the given networked system.        -   A remote computing device may be (i) outside of the given            networked system, or (ii) inside the given networked system.            In other words, a remote computing device is not necessarily            physically remote from the given networked system. It is            called “remote” to indicate its functionality is logically            separate from the functionality of the given networked            system.        -   A remote computing device may (i) be a dedicated computing            device that is dedicated only to doing penetration testing,            or (ii) also implement other functionality not directly            related to penetration testing.        -   A remote computing device is not limited to be a single            physical device with a single processing unit. It may be            implemented by multiple separate physical devices packaged            in separate packages that may be located at different            locations. Each of the separate physical devices may include            one or multiple processing units.        -   A remote computing device may be (i) a physical computing            device, or (ii) a virtual machine running inside a physical            computing device on top of a hosting operating system.    -   51. “explicitly selecting”—Directly and clearly selecting, by a        human user, of one option out of multiple options available to        the human user, leaving no room for doubt and not relying on        making deductions by a computing device.        -   Examples of explicit selections are (i) selection of a            specific type of an attacker from a drop-down list of            types, (ii) selection of specific one or more attacker            capabilities by marking one or more check boxes in a group            of multiple check boxes corresponding to multiple attacker            capabilities, and (iii) reception for viewing by a user of a            recommendation automatically computed by a computing device            for a value of an information item and actively approving by            the user of the recommendation for using the value, provided            that the approving user has an option of rejecting the            recommendation and selecting a different value for the            information item.        -   Examples of selections that are not explicit selections            are (i) selection of specific one or more attacker            capabilities by selecting a specific scenario of a            penetration testing system from a pre-defined library of            scenarios, where the specific scenario includes an attacker            having the one or more capabilities, and (ii) selection of            specific one or more attacker capabilities by selecting a            specific goal of an attacker, accompanied by a deduction by            a computing device concluding that the specific one or more            attacker capabilities must be selected because they are            essential for the attacker to succeed in meeting the            specific goal.    -   52. “automatically selecting”—Selecting, by a computing device,        of one option out of multiple options, without receiving from a        human user an explicit selection of the selected option. It        should be noted that the selecting of an option is an automatic        selecting even if the computing device is basing the selection        on one or more explicit selections by the user, as long as the        selected option itself is not explicitly selected by the user.        It should also be noted that receiving from a user of an        approval for a recommendation which is otherwise automatically        selected without giving the user an ability to override the        recommendation does not make the selection a non-automatic        selection.        -   An example of an automatic selection is a selection by a            computing device of one or more attacker capabilities by (a)            receiving from a user an explicit selection of a specific            scenario of a penetration testing system from a pre-defined            library of scenarios, (b) determining by the computing            device that the specific scenario includes an attacker            having the one or more capabilities, and (c) deducing by the            computing device that the user wants to select the one or            more attacker capabilities.        -   An example of a selection that is not an automatic selection            is a selection of a value for an information item by (a)            calculating by a computing device of a recommended value for            the information item, (b) displaying the recommendation to a            user, and (c) receiving from the user an explicit approval            to use the recommended value of the information item,            provided that the approving user has an option of rejecting            the recommendation and selecting a different value for the            information item.    -   53. “user interface”—A man-machine interface that does at least        one of (i) providing information to a user, and (ii) receiving        input from the user. Towards this end, any user interface        includes at least one of (i) an input device (e.g. touch-screen,        mouse, keyboard, joystick, camera) for receiving input from the        user, and (ii) an output device (e.g. display screen such as a        touch-screen, speaker) for providing information to the user. A        user interface typically also includes executable user-interface        code for at least one of (i) causing the output device to        provide information to the user (e.g. to display text associated        with radio-buttons or with a check list, or text of a drop-down        list) and (ii) processing user-input received via the input        device.        -   In different examples, the executable code may be            compiled-code (e.g. in assembly or machine-language),            interpreted byte-code (e.g. Java byte-code), or            browser-executed code (e.g. JavaScript code) that may be            sent to a client device from a remote server and then            executed by the client device.    -   54. “user interface of a computing device”—A user interface that        is functionally attached to the computing device and serves the        computing device for interacting with the user.        -   An input device of a user interface of a computing device            may share a common housing with the computing device (e.g. a            touch-screen of a tablet), or may be physically separate            from the computing device and be in communication with it,            either through a physical port (e.g. a USB port) or            wirelessly (e.g. a wireless mouse).        -   An output device of a user interface of a computing device            may share a common housing with the computing device (e.g. a            touch-screen of a tablet), or may be physically separate            from the computing device and be in communication with it,            either through a physical port (e.g. an HDMI port) or            wirelessly.        -   User-interface code of a user interface of a computing            device is stored in a memory accessible to the computing            device and is executed by one or more processors of the            computing device. In one example related to web-based user            interfaces, at least some of this code may be received from            a remote server and then locally executed by the computing            device which functions as a client. In another example            related to locally-implemented user interfaces, all of the            user-interface code is pre-loaded onto the computing device.    -   55. “random selection”—A selection that depends on a random or        pseudo-random factor. Different possible outcomes in a random        selection do not necessarily have the same probabilities of        being selected.    -   56. “subset/subgroup of a given set/group” or “sub-set/sub-group        of a given set/group”—A set/group that satisfies the condition        that that every member of it is also a member of the given        set/group. Unless otherwise stated, a subset/subgroup may be        empty and contain no members at all. Unless otherwise stated, a        subset/subgroup of a given set/group may contain all the members        of the given set/group and be equal to the given set/group.    -   57. “proper subset/subgroup of a given set/group” or “proper        sub-set/sub-group of a given set/group”—A subset/subgroup of the        given set/group that is not equal to the given set/group. In        other words, there is at least one member of the given set/group        that is not a member of the subset/subgroup.    -   58. “or”—A logical operator combining two Boolean input        conditions into a Boolean compound condition, such that the        compound condition is satisfied if and only if at least one of        the two input conditions is satisfied. In other words, if        condition C=condition A or condition B, then condition C is not        satisfied when both condition A and condition B are not        satisfied, but is satisfied in each of the following cases: (i)        condition A is satisfied and condition B is not satisfied, (ii)        condition A is not satisfied and condition B is satisfied,        and (iii) both condition A and condition B are satisfied.

It will be appreciated that certain features of the invention, whichare, for clarity, described in the context of separate embodiments, mayalso be provided in combination in a single embodiment. Conversely,various features of the invention, which are, for brevity, described inthe context of a single embodiment, may also be provided separately orin any suitable sub-combination.

Although the invention has been described in conjunction with specificembodiments thereof, it is evident that many alternatives, modificationsand variations will be apparent to those skilled in the art.Accordingly, it is intended to embrace all such alternatives,modifications and variations that fall within the spirit and broad scopeof the appended claims. All publications, patents and patentapplications mentioned in this specification are herein incorporated intheir entirety by reference into the specification, to the same extentas if each individual publication, patent or patent application wasspecifically and individually indicated to be incorporated herein byreference. In addition, citation or identification of any reference inthis application shall not be construed as an admission that suchreference is available as prior art to the present invention.

The invention claimed is:
 1. A method of penetration testing of anetworked system by a penetration testing system that is controlled by auser interface of a computing device, the method comprising: a.selecting a plurality of lateral movement strategies from a group of twoor more lateral movement strategies that are available to be used inpenetration testing campaigns; b. subsequent to the selecting of theplurality of lateral movement strategies, executing, by the penetrationtesting system, a plurality of penetration testing campaigns, wherein(i) the number of penetration testing campaigns in the plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns is equal to the number of lateral movementstrategies in the selected plurality of lateral movement strategies,(ii) for each specific lateral movement strategy in the selectedplurality of lateral movement strategies there is a correspondingpenetration testing campaign in the plurality of penetration testingcampaigns that uses the specific lateral movement strategy as thelateral movement strategy of the attacker of the correspondingpenetration testing campaign, and (iii) values of all information items,other than lateral movement strategy, are equal in all penetrationtesting campaigns in the plurality of penetration testing campaigns; andc. reporting, by the penetration testing system, at least one securityvulnerability determined to exist in the networked system by theexecuting of the plurality of penetration testing campaigns, wherein thereporting comprises at least one operation selected from the groupconsisting of: (i) causing a display device to display a reportincluding information about the at least one security vulnerability,(ii) storing the report including information about the at least onesecurity vulnerability in a file, and (iii) electronically transmittingthe report including information about the at least one securityvulnerability.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the selecting of theplurality of lateral movement strategies includes selecting all of thelateral movement strategies in the group of two or more lateral movementstrategies to be the selected plurality of lateral movement strategies.3. The method of claim 1, wherein the selecting of the plurality oflateral movement strategies includes selecting only some of the lateralmovement strategies in the group of two or more lateral movementstrategies to be the selected plurality of lateral movement strategies.4. The method of claim 1, wherein the selecting of the plurality oflateral movement strategies comprises automatically selecting theplurality of lateral movement strategies from the group of two or morelateral movement strategies, by the penetration testing system.
 5. Themethod of claim 4, wherein the automatically selecting of the pluralityof lateral movement strategies is based on a value of an informationitem of the plurality of penetration testing campaigns.
 6. The method ofclaim 4, wherein the automatically selecting of the plurality of lateralmovement strategies is a random selection.
 7. The method of claim 1,wherein the selecting of the plurality of lateral movement strategiesincludes receiving, by the penetration testing system and via the userinterface of the computing device, one or more manually-entered inputs,the one or more manually-entered inputs selecting the plurality oflateral movement strategies from the group of two or more lateralmovement strategies.
 8. The method of claim 1, wherein a number oflateral movement strategies in the selected plurality of lateralmovement strategies is pre-defined by a vendor of the penetrationtesting system.
 9. The method of claim 1, wherein a number of lateralmovement strategies in the selected plurality of lateral movementstrategies depends on a value of an information item of the plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns.
 10. The method of claim 1, wherein theselecting of the plurality of lateral movement strategies includesreceiving, by the penetration testing system and via the user interfaceof the computing device, one or more manually-entered inputs, the one ormore manually-entered inputs defining a number of lateral movementstrategies in the selected plurality of lateral movement strategies. 11.The method of claim 1, further comprising, prior to the selecting,determining, by the penetration testing system, the group of two or morelateral movement strategies that are available to be used in penetrationtesting campaigns.
 12. The method of claim 11, wherein the determiningof the group of two or more lateral movement strategies that areavailable to be used in penetration testing campaigns is based on avalue of an information item of the plurality of penetration testingcampaigns.
 13. The method of claim 1, wherein the executing of theplurality of penetration testing campaigns includes executing at leasttwo penetration testing campaigns of the plurality of penetrationtesting campaigns in parallel.
 14. The method of claim 1, wherein theexecuting of the plurality of penetration testing campaigns includesexecuting at least two penetration testing campaigns of the plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns in series.
 15. The method of claim 14,wherein the at least two penetration testing campaigns executed inseries are executed according to an order of the corresponding lateralmovement strategies, wherein the order of the lateral movementstrategies is pre-defined by a vendor of the penetration testing system.16. The method of claim 14, wherein the at least two penetration testingcampaigns executed in series are executed according to a random orderdetermined at the time of the executing.
 17. The method of claim 1,wherein said executing the plurality of penetration testing campaignscomprises assigning a corresponding time limit to each penetrationtesting campaign of said plurality of penetration testing campaigns,wherein execution time of each penetration testing campaign of theplurality of penetration testing campaigns is limited by thecorresponding time limit.
 18. The method of claim 17, wherein theplurality of penetration testing campaigns includes a first penetrationtesting campaign and a second penetration testing campaign, wherein thetime limit assigned to the first penetration testing campaign isdifferent from the time limit assigned to the second penetration testingcampaign.
 19. The method of claim 1, wherein the executing of theplurality of penetration testing campaigns comprises: in response todetermining, by one penetration testing campaign of the plurality ofpenetration testing campaigns, that at least one security vulnerabilityexists in the networked system, (i) aborting all penetration testingcampaigns of the plurality of penetration testing campaigns that arerunning at the time of the determining, and (ii) cancelling execution ofall penetration testing campaigns of the plurality of penetrationtesting campaigns scheduled to be executed that have not yet startedexecution at the time of determining.
 20. A penetration testing systemfor penetration testing of a networked system, the penetration testingsystem comprising: a. a set-up module including: i. one or more set-upprocessors; and ii. a set-up non-transitory computer readable storagemedium for instructions execution by the one or more set-up processors,the set-up non-transitory computer readable storage medium having storedinstructions to select a plurality of lateral movement strategies from agroup of two or more lateral movement strategies that are available tobe used in penetration testing campaigns; b. apenetration-testing-campaign module including: i. one or morepenetration-testing-campaign processors; and ii. apenetration-testing-campaign non-transitory computer readable storagemedium for instructions execution by the one or morepenetration-testing-campaign processors, thepenetration-testing-campaign non-transitory computer readable storagemedium having stored instructions, to be executed subsequent toexecution of the instructions to select a plurality of lateral movementstrategies by the one or more set-up processors, to execute a pluralityof penetration testing campaigns, wherein (i) the number of penetrationtesting campaigns in the plurality of penetration testing campaigns isequal to the number of lateral movement strategies in the selectedplurality of lateral movement strategies, (ii) for each specific lateralmovement strategy in the selected plurality of lateral movementstrategies there is a corresponding penetration testing campaign in theplurality of penetration testing campaigns that uses the specificlateral movement strategy as the lateral movement strategy of theattacker of the corresponding penetration testing campaign, an (iii)values of all information items, other than lateral movement strategy,are equal in all penetration testing campaigns in the plurality ofpenetration testing; and c. a reporting module, including: i. one ormore reporting processors; and ii. a reporting non-transitory computerreadable storage medium for instructions execution by the one or morereporting processors, the reporting non-transitory computer readablestorage medium having stored instructions to report at least onesecurity vulnerability determined to exist in the networked systemaccording to results of the plurality of penetration testing campaignsexecuted by the penetration testing campaign module, the instructions toreport including at least one member selected from the group consistingof: (i) instructions to cause a display device to display a reportincluding information about the at least one security vulnerability,(ii) instructions to store the report including information about the atleast one security vulnerability in a file, and (iii) instructions toelectronically transmit the report including information about the atleast one security vulnerability.